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ABSTRACT
Los Zetas, Neoliberalism, and Popular Opposition: A Study in Linkages
Gina Renee Lyle

Los Zetas are considered by security analysts to be a transformative force within
transnational criminal organizations (TCO), exporting their unique model
throughout Mexico. Los Zetas’ idiosyncratic interventions include their
diversification of criminal operations, professionalization of TCO security,
sophisticated use of media and technology, extreme forms of violent coercion,
and decentralized command structure. This project aims to complicate the
narrative that Los Zetas emerged because of top leaders’ sadistic tendencies or
due to an inherently violent culture in Mexico by reframing the group’s evolution
within historical processes. Moving beyond Los Zetas, this project examines how
persons affected by Los Zetas’ indiscriminate use of violence are forces of
activism and social change, connecting opposition culture in Mexico to criminal
impunity and resistance movements in Guerrero. Examining Los Zetas in
connection with Cold War militarization in Latin America, processes of
democratization in Mexico, and the neoliberal order, this analysis views Los
Zetas as products and agents of structural inequities, destroying spaces of
community cohesion to create spaces of elite economic growth.

Keywords: Los Zetas, Neoliberalism, Cold War, Militarization, Democratization,
Opposition, Guerrero, Tamaulipas, Allende, Structural Violence, Dispossession
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2011, the international hacktivist group Anonymous, an online collective known
for infiltrating and attacking corporate and government entities, took on the transnational
criminal organization (TCO) Los Zetas after a member of Anonymous was reportedly
kidnapped by the organization. In response to the abduction, which occurred in
Veracruz, Mexico, on October 6, 2011, Anonymous posted a video threatening to
expose the identities of Los Zetas and their collaborators, including public officials and
taxi drivers. The hacktivists directed Los Zetas to either release their prisoner by
November 5 or risk having the names and addresses of their “servants,” many of whom
worked as municipal police, posted to the internet for all to see.1
Los Zetas transformed the model of TCOs in Mexico, and while the conflict with
Anonymous was just a small bump in the road for the group, it nevertheless illustrates
the uniqueness of their model, and how they utilized irregular forms of warfare, including
the media, in distinctive and forward-thinking ways. For Anonymous, the internet was a
space to promote accessibility and the liberation of information. For Los Zetas,
cyberspace was a domain integral to operational expansion as well as a space through
which the group could enforce zones of silence.2 The Anonymous clash occurred at the
height of Los Zetas’ corrosive power and was sandwiched in between two abhorrent
massacres in Tamaulipas. The interaction, in addition to showcasing Los Zetas’

Associated Press, “Anonymous Hackers Threaten Mexican Drug Cartel,” Guardian, Oct. 31,
2011, accessed January 15, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/31/anonymoushackers-mexican-drug-cartel.
2
Paul Rexton Kan, “Cyberwar in the Underworld: Anonymous vs. Los Zetas in Mexico,” Yale
Journal of International Affairs (Winter 2013).
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technological sophistication, signifies the growing opposition to Zeta authority from a
variety of actors. The opposition came at a moment when Los Zetas seemed to be
basking in the glow of growth and power, indeed at a moment they had
comprehensively penetrated state and social systems in their zones of operation.
In the Anonymous video, the group defiantly contended, “Veracruz, Mexico and the
world is tired of the criminal group the Zetas, which is dedicated to kidnapping, stealing,
and extortion.” Anonymous then went on to declare, “You have made a great mistake by
taking one of us. Free him,” by Friday, November 5, or there will be consequences. “We
cannot defend ourselves with weapons, but we know who they are. Information is free.
We do not forgive. We do not forget.”3
Anonymous did not move forward with exposing the members and collaborators
of Los Zetas and eventually withdrew their threat from the public sphere. The hacktivists
are a decentralized group without a cohesive mandate or system of defense and their
withdrawal from the conflict may be attributed to the fact that Stratfor, a security
company, warned Anonymous that Los Zetas had hired cybersecurity professionals to
track their operatives.4 Paul Rexton Kan argues the “release of this information on the
internet would have exposed members of Los Zetas to not only possible arrest by
Mexican authorities, but also to assassination by rival cartels.”5 The retreat by both
Anonymous and Los Zetas may have therefore come from fears of mutually assured
destruction. There were also reports that the kidnapped Anonymous member had been

AP, “Anonymous Hackers Threaten.”
Charles Arthur, “Anonymous Retreats from Mexico Drug Cartel Confrontation,” Guardian,
November 2, 2011, accessed January 15, 2021,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/nov/02/anonymous-zetas-hacking-climbdown.
5
Kan, “Cyberwar in the Underworld.”
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quietly released on November 4, one day before the deadline.6 Despite the fact that the
specifics of the conflict are vague and difficult to verify, a challenge to the research of
TCOs more broadly and this thesis more specifically, the dispute continues to illustrate
how evolving landscapes of irregular warfare, expanding modes of coercion, the unique
use of technology, and a modern organizational structure resulted in a transformation,
revolutionizing criminal organizations throughout Mexico.
1.1 Los Zetas: TCO Disruptors
Los Zetas began in the state of Tamaulipas, Mexico, in the 1990s, originally
serving as the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel (CDG). The enforcer wing was formed from
Mexican army deserters who were members of elite military units and trained in
counterinsurgency methods. Through their professionalization of violence,
diversification of operations, indiscriminate methods of coercion, use of technology, and
horizontal command structure,7 the organization represents a clear paradigm shift within
TCO modeling, disrupting traditional hierarchies and modes of structure. As trained
members of the military, the group used military culture, discipline, and weaponry skills
to maintain a strong power base. The group’s flamboyant methods of violence became
a potent source of coercion, allowing for widespread extortion in their regions of
operation. In response to Los Zetas’ methods and organizational structure, other TCOs
in Mexico created their own enforcer wings. For instance, groups including Barrio
Azteca, Los Negros, and Gente Nueva replicated the model of Los Zetas by
professionalizing their enforcement units.8 Los Zetas’ rapid growth, infiltration of

Adam Clark Estes, “Anonymous and Los Zetas Cartel Declare a Truce,” Atlantic, Nov. 4, 2011.
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017).
8
Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas, 37.
6
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Mexican society, and indiscriminate modes of violence challenged the state’s monopoly
on violence and its control over the formation of social structures,9 assaulting the state’s
“legitimate” right to exert authority and control over the population.
What place do TCOs, and Los Zetas more specifically, have in academic
discourse? Too often the limited scholarly analysis has relied upon civilizational rhetoric,
framing modern against unmodern, barbaric against developed, essentializing TCOs
within Latin America as inherently hyperviolent. The focus of scholars such as Zeta
expert George Grayson has been the role of sadism as an instrument of warfare, as
typified, for example, by the dissolution of their victims’ bodies in vats of acid.10 While
extreme coercive strategies are certainly a part of Los Zetas’ interventions, the subtext
of such rhetoric, without the inclusion of structural and socioeconomic causes, greatly
obfuscates the complexity of their emergence and reinforces imperialistic constructs.
Post-Cold War modes of violence, of which Los Zetas are included, are,
according to anthropologist Kees Koonings, characterized by economic as opposed to
ideological motivations.11 Koonings argues while old patterns of violence, occurring from
1950-1980, were motivated by “social inequity, political exclusion, and
authoritarianism,”12 new forms of violence are similarly motivated by social inequality
and exclusion but are less overtly political. New forms of violence, for the purposes of
this thesis, can be defined as a “democratization in the sense that a variety of social

9

Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965).
George W. Grayson, The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as
an Instrument of Cartel Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,
2014).
11
Kees Koonings, “New Violence, Insecurity, and the State: Reflections on Latin America and
Mexico,” in Violence, Coercion, and State Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico: The Other Half
of the Centaur, ed. Wil G. Pansters (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).
12
Koonings, “New Violence, Insecurity,” 255.
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actors pursue a variety of objectives and coercive strategies.”13 These pursuits, while
not directly related to ideological movements, are nevertheless connected to historical
precedents and the social force of neoliberalism.
The emergence of Los Zetas brings two primary questions to the forefront: what
historical factors contributed to Los Zetas’ model, and are they a political organization?
While there cannot be a rigid demarcation between ideological motivations and
economic motivations (the interaction between the two exist within a porous space),14
there has been a marked shift in the patterns of non-state actors. This pattern, in which
the violence of leftist insurgents has been replaced by depoliticized TCOs, is connected
to both weakened state systems and neoliberal economic policies. Such economic
policies, which are also inherently social in nature, have contributed to widespread
poverty and dehumanization in Latin America.
Sociologist and journalist Dawn Paley argues the neoliberal revolution is
differentiated from the Cold War because it occurs during an era of democratization and
at a time when “neoliberalism is being consolidated as the hegemonic global model of
economic and social governance.”15 The shift is also characterized by the intentional
depoliticization of the conflicts to uphold the neoliberal mandate. In this system,
confusion is central to maintaining order and control. This confusion is partly achieved
by linking both perpetrators and victims of violence to criminal activity, thereby creating

Koonings, “New Violence, Insecurity,” 258.
Nigel Gould Davies’ examination of ideology and realism within the context of Cold War
international relations in that the two constructs are not mutually exclusive but exist alongside
one another can be applied to the examination of TCOs within Mexico. See Nigel Gould Davies,
“Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War,” Journal of Cold
War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 90-109.
15
Dawn Marie Paley, “Cold War, Neoliberal War, and Disappearance: Observations from
Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives 48, no.1 (January 2021): 152.
13
14
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societal vertigo to prevent forms of solidarity. Finally, the revolution outsources its main
actors, who use extreme coercive strategies, including the grotesque display of bodies
and elevated methods of torture, to communicate terror and exact division.16 The
depoliticization is a strategy, therefore, to obscure the inherent political nature of
poverty, displacement, and terrorization. The siloed approach, in which there is a solid
demarcation between Cold War conflicts and post-Cold War conflicts severs crucial
aspects of the interaction. In truth there are connective precedents integral to the
evolving forms of conflict in Latin America. This thesis expands upon scholars who
implement a more holistic approach, including political scientist Guadalupe CorreaCabrera and Dawn Paley, by examining the fluidity of historical context, including
democratization, militarization, and neoliberalism, to understand the evolution and
impact of Los Zetas.
1.2 The Modernity of Los Zetas
Are Los Zetas exceptional, are they modern, and how have neoliberalism and
state formation contributed to their emergence? In chapter 2, “Replications of
Modernity,” I explore the socioeconomic conditions necessary for the emergence of Los
Zetas, arguing their evolution is related to a weakening PRI and more fluid borders. The
section will examine how the fragmentation from democratization has been utilized by
the group and replicated in sophisticated ways. While idiosyncratic in their modeling and
trajectory, Los Zetas are inextricably linked to the process of state formation and
neoliberalism, filling vacuums of power with their unique organizational structure and
methods of coercion. Using documents such as FBI assessments, consulate

16

Paley, “Cold War, Neoliberal War,” 152.
6

communications, and DEA assessments, I will examine their professionalization of
violence, their diversification of operations, their indiscriminate use of violence, and their
horizontal command structure and compare it traditional TCOs, who utilized amateur
security, used targeted violence, and a vertical command structure often connected to
familial connections.17
While the traditional TCO more closely resembles pre-modern or monarchical
systems of power, relying on allegiances formed through traditional hierarchies, Los
Zetas utilize democratic power structures and meritocratic mobility. Additionally, the
organization’s utilization of technology, including their use of media and a proprietary
radio network, further accentuates their replication of modernity. The replication of
democratization viewed through the model of Los Zetas reinforces the argument that
neoliberalism was a structural agent of capitalism and a force of social change, and
while Los Zetas benefitted from new modes of warfare, including their use of social
media to exert power, the public sphere likewise replicated the democratization of
Mexico, wielding information as a weapon of agency.
1.3 Impunity and Opposition
Discourse surrounding the conflict with Los Zetas often frames the interaction
through a unidirectional lens, positioning Los Zetas as the central agents of change.
Chapter 3, “Impunity and Opposition,” reorients the framework to include resistance as
a significant force of change that is rooted in both democratization and the Dirty War in
Guerrero. This section is informed by the work of historian Pablo Piccato, who explores
the relationship between crime, truth, and justice in Mexico. In a modern justice system,

17

Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc., 59.
7

a crime is committed, police investigate the crime to determine what occurred, and
justice is carried out by the judiciary. In Mexico, Piccato argues crime has been defined
by a disconnection between these three tenets, and this disconnection has led to both a
tolerance for extrajudicial punishment and a robust public discourse surrounding
criminality.18 The abolishment of the jury trial in 1929, for instance, ignited a crisis of
transparency in which popular participation was extinguished, and the justice system
assumed an opaque quality. After 1929, extrajudicial forms of justice expanded
dramatically, and the press became a legitimate source of truth for the public.
The press assumed a role outside the boundary of typical private enterprise and
participated in police investigations as a legitimate partner in state action. In this zone of
exclusion, the media is a space through which the public can search for truth and exact
justice. Considering the state has normalized impunity, the media can therefore be
viewed as the arm of the people, and a method through which popular agency
challenges TCOs.
During her discourse on the fragmentation of the police, Diane Davis argues the
police were central to historical conflicts in Mexico, including the 1910 Mexican
Revolution and the neoliberal transition of the nineties. Davis argues impunity is partly
rooted in a 1917 constitutional reform that separated the judicial forces from the
preventive forces. This resulted in a fragmentation of the police and led to challenges of
accountability as well as threats to state legitimacy. To combat impunity during the
Calderón administration, a more militaristic approach was applied to quell conflicts, and

18

Pablo Piccato, A History of Infamy: Crime, Truth, and Justice in Mexico (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2017).
8

included the use of lie detector tests and coerced resignations among judicial police.19
While this may have led to increased accountability from above, it was limiting in its
accountability from below.
Democratization can, like the formation of the criminal justice system, be viewed
as integral to the evolution of activism and resistance in Mexico. This thesis explores
how the democratic transition did not simply “happen” in 2000 but slowly progressed
and is rooted in opposition groups who methodically undermined the authority of the
PRI. This culture of dissent is also viewed through the uprising in Guerrero during the
1960s and 1970s, in which violent state repression was countered by the work of rebel
Lucio Cabañas. Both the process of democratization and the history of popular
uprisings provide a window through which to view forms of opposition to Los Zetas.
Additionally, Chapter 3 explores challenges to Zeta authority in media spaces as well as
through the resistance of the 72 migrants who were kidnapped in Tamaulipas in 2010.
Limitations to this examination include the inherent biases of journalistic and
social media sources. Such biases, however, if examined through the lens through
which the source was constructed, as well as in concert with academic literature, may
prove valuable in revealing perspectives and modes of thinking. While Los Zetas utilized
the tools of democratization to expand their model, the public likewise commandeered
the democratizing space to challenge impunity, using transparency to exact justice.
These acts can thus be viewed as crucial to the activism that ultimately contributed to
the fragmentation and decline of Los Zetas.

Diane Davis, “Policing and Regime Transition: From Post-Authoritarianism to Populism to
Neoliberalism,” in Violence, Coercion, and State Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico: The
Other Half of the Centaur, ed. Wil G. Pansters (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 84.
19

9

1.4 Neoliberalism and Criminality
What interaction exists between neoliberalism and criminality? The work of David
Harvey provides a foundational framework through which to view neoliberalism more
broadly. Harvey argues neoliberalism is a political project by the capitalist elite to
mitigate the social and economic effects of revolutionary movements during the 1960s
and 1970s and is used to curb the power of labor.20 Harvey contextualizes neoliberal
policies historically, arguing postwar capitalism and its uneasy alliance with labor
(brokered by a state who focused on social welfare and the individual wage) was no
longer fostering economic growth. The era of stagnation resulted in a 1970s crisis of
capital accumulation.21
This thesis explores the construct of neoliberalism within the policies inspired by
the “Washington Consensus,” in which there was a formula for “sustained economic
growth and seamless national development,”22 and is characterized by “a
comprehensive program of balanced budgets, reduced taxes, decontrolled interest
rates, floating exchange rates, liberalized trade relations, open foreign investment,
deregulation, and privatization.”23 Policy changes, such as NAFTA, resulted in an
uneven distribution of wealth and increasing economic and social marginalization of the
global South, with farmers and other non-corporate entities unable to compete with
powerful transnational corporations. This thesis does not seek to categorically equate

20

David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
2005).
21
David Harvey, “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,” The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 610, no. 1 (March 2007): 27.
22
Douglas S. Massey, Magaly Sanchez R., and Jere R. Behrman, “Introduction: Of Myths and
Markets,” in Chronicle of a Myth Foretold: The Washington Consensus in Latin America
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2006), Volume 606, 8.
23
Massey, et al., “Myths and Markets,” 8.
10

neoliberalism with criminality, but to identify how structural changes that began in the
1970s changed the nature of capitalism and became a social force in Mexico.24 The end
result has been the internalization of neoliberal mandates and a restructuring of political
and socioeconomic systems.
Chapter 4 will examine the social force of neoliberalism in Tamaulipas to view
how it displaced and divided the population. The social division as well as a weakened
Mexican state also provided a space for TCOs to challenge state authority outside a
Weberian construction of legitimacy. While a conspiracy between corporate elites and
TCOs is not a contention of this thesis, there is a paradoxical alignment of interests in
that instability in Mexico and weak state systems ultimately facilitates capital expansion
and elite hegemony. In the state of Tamaulipas, for instance, the instability caused by
Zeta violence opened a space for private capital to buy land and exploit the region so
rich in resources.
Porfirian liberalism, a period that was marked by an influx of American capital
that undermined Mexican sovereignty, informs my analysis of Los Zetas and the
neoliberal period. In Empire and Revolution, John Mason Hart examines the extensive
involvement of American capitalists within the Mexican political sphere from the Civil
War to the end of the twentieth century. The monograph uses detailed case studies of
American industrialists and financiers, from their development of the Mexican railway
system to their control of the Mexican insurance industry, to explore the deep
interactions between the United States and Mexico. This monograph highlights
connections between American capital and shifting political processes, including the
David Adam Morton, “Structural Change and Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Third World Quarterly
24, no. 4 (August 2003): 631-53.
24
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Mexican Revolution and WWII.25 Hart details the astounding amount of capital that
flowed into Mexico before the Revolution, including that of William Randolph Hearst,
George T. Bliss, Percy Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan, highlighting the concept of
Mexican corruption as a justification for U.S. intervention.
For instance, although Mexican President Lerdo (served as president from 1872
to 1876) was open to privatization, he still feared American hegemony and did not want
to be alienated from trade with Europe through a bilateral trade agreement. This was at
a time when Mexican nationalists and campesinos opposed the hacienda system,
raiding large plantations and demanding restoration of “usurped” lands.26 As a result,
Lerdo canceled major contracts with American financiers, resulting in American
intervention. To protect their financial interests, and with the support of the United
States Government, U.S. elites armed General Diaz, helping him to depose the
democratically elected Lerdo in 1876. This interaction highlights a pattern of behavior,
illuminating the U.S. penchant for support of military regimes to uphold American
financial interests in Latin America.
With respect to the linkages between liberalism and neoliberalism, Hart argues
Mexican interactions with the United States, including policies such as NAFTA, can
serve as a framework through which to view American hegemony. Hart contends such
interactions are critical to understanding “how the United States became a global
empire, the impulses behind neoliberalism, the growth of American culture in Latin
America, Asia, and Africa, and the process of globalization.”27 Beyond globalization,

25

John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americas in Mexico since the Civil War
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
26
Hart, Empire and Revolution, 56.
27
Hart, Empire and Revolution, 2.
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Hart explores the ongoing conflict between Mexican sovereignty and American
hegemony, a dialectical struggle that continues to this day. This thesis will explore how
economically motivated violence is connected to structural inequities and the period of
democratization, which transformed entrenched hierarchical structures of the
authoritarian PRI.
A linear narrative between TCOs and historical precedents such as neoliberalism
would oversimplify the shifting landscape of irregular warfare in Mexico, but a closer
analysis of state formation and global economic patterns of development are crucial to
understanding Los Zetas and their unique characteristics. I will examine how Los Zetas’
use of irregular warfare and their use of hypermodern superstructures of hegemony
caused instability, weakening Mexican state authority. Ultimately, this instability allowed
a space for private capital to invest and exploit. This is the paradox: Los Zetas use the
tools of modernity and globalization to advance economic interests and simultaneously
uphold elite and imperialistic structures that seek to subjugate their interests and the
interests of Mexican sovereignty more broadly.
In the end, Los Zetas’ greatest power became their greatest weakness, and while
their extreme strategies of coercion worked to solidify power, they simultaneously
magnified criminal operations, facilitating widespread retaliation. The group’s unique
structure challenged entrenched hierarchies, uniting seemingly disparate interests to
strike against the disruptors. This is a story about the power of interaction between
different spheres of operation, in which state formation and economic policies facilitate
shifts within TCO structures. It is also a story about the power of popular resistance, a
force that ceaselessly illuminates forms of injustice.

13

Chapter 2
Replications of Modernity
In May of 2013, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, announced
four men were facing up to twenty years in prison after they had been convicted of
laundering millions of dollars of illicit Zeta funds to “purchase, train, breed and race
American quarter horses in the United States.”1 The complex conspiracy to legitimate
proceeds involved using straw purchasers to make transactions. The launderers were
also careful to make deposits under $10,000 to avoid mandatory bank reporting federal
requirements.2 Jose Treviño Morales, the brother of Zeta leader Miguel Treviño
Morales, was among those convicted. When the FBI arrested the seemingly ordinary
Jose Treviño, a bricklayer by trade, he reportedly told the arresting officers, “You can
pick your friends, you can’t pick your family.”3 Jose Treviño was remembered fondly by
equine lovers. Former American Quarter Horse Association president Jim Helzer recalls
Jose blended seamlessly into the community, saying “you would think he was the nicest
guy who ever walked.”
Oklahoma City Clerk Kim McClarney also had good things to say about Jose:
“He played the part of the cowboy, very respectful. I was shocked to hear the brother

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, Federal
Jury in Austin Convicts Fourth in Multi-Million Dollar Money Laundering Conspiracy Involving
Los Zetas Drug Trafficking Proceeds, Extortion, and Bribery: Cash from the Sale of Drugs was
Laundered to Purchase, Train, Breed, and Race American Quarter Horses in U.S., May 9, 2013,
accessed on April 1, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/federal-jury-austin-convictsfourt-multi-million-dollar-money-laundering-conspiracy.
2
DOJ, Federal Jury Convicts Fourth.
3
Dallasnews Administrator, “Auction of Horses Allegedly Linked to Zetas Drug Cartel Draws
Interest,” The Dallas Morning News, October 14, 2012, accessed on April 15, 2021,
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2012/10/15/auction-of-horses-allegedly-linked-to-zetas-drugcartel-draws-interest/.
1
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was…evil, and is into beheadings!”4 While people were shocked and appalled an
associate of Los Zetas was hiding in plain sight, and insisted they were not interested
“in those drug cartel horses,”5 prospective buyers quickly cast their outrage aside in the
name of a good bargain. In all, more than four hundred quarter horses sold without
issue, yielding more than nine million dollars.6 Additionally, the U.S. Government sought
a monetary judgment of sixty million dollars, the amount they estimated was derived
from the illegal operation.
Scholars such as George Grayson sensationalize the violence and sadism of Los
Zetas, dwelling on beheadings and boiled bodies rather than the historical causes that
facilitated the group’s growth. For instance, Grayson characterizes Zeta leader Miguel
Treviño Morales (Z-40) as a man who “could not sleep at night unless he killed,”7
arguing Los Zetas’ violence is a manifestation of top leaders’ sadistic personality
disorder (SPD)—a disorder where one “derives pleasure from harming or humiliating
others.”8 Schemes such as the complex money laundering operation not only question
the simplicity of such frameworks but illustrate the transnational complexity of Los
Zetas’ operations. By examining the group’s history, structure, technology, and
transnational connections, this chapter will move beyond sadism and argue for the
exceptionalism of Los Zetas.
While extreme forms of violence are crucial to the branding and forms of coercion
utilized by Los Zetas and should be examined in detail, hyperbole obscures the context

Dallasnews Administrator, “Auction of Horses.”
Dallasnews Administrator, “Auction of Horses.”
6
DOJ, Federal Jury Convicts Fourth.
7
Grayson, Evolution of Los Zetas, 6.
8
Grayson, Evolution of Los Zetas, 5.
4
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of the violence. The sensationalism has likewise dramatically influenced popular
conceptions of Latin American countries, framing them as inherently violent, residing
outside modern, civil society. Z-40 can no doubt be categorized as sadistic but how
could this extreme form of sadism thrive within the organization? Why was their brand
and structure replicated throughout Mexico? A few sadistic leaders cannot transform the
structure of criminal organizations without collaboration, collusion, and consent. In short,
why here, why now, and why did it spread?
2.1 Genesis
The rise of globalization and policy shifts such as NAFTA transformed the state
of Tamaulipas, the cradle of Los Zetas, into a region that was increasingly coveted and
contested by TCOs. With eighteen border crossings, more than any other state in
Mexico, and with Nuevo Laredo handling “approximately 40 percent of the trade
between Mexico and the United States,”9 the area became a booming center of growth.
In Nuevo Laredo alone, “over eight thousand vehicles and more than three hundred
thousand people cross”10 into Texas via international bridges every day. Tamaulipas
became a key region for corporate and criminal expansion alike, forming a gateway to
markets and capital.
Due to an increase in trade, cities along the border, including Nuevo Laredo,
Miguel Alemán, Reynosa, Río Bravo, and Matamoros, assumed a more fluid quality,
and a rapid increase in the movement of legitimate goods within Tamaulipas was
inverted and then replicated by TCOs, who were able to fill the power vacuum left by a
weakened state with both merchandise and power. Reduced trade barriers, dissolving
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rigid border demarcations, had the unintended consequence of creating a robust space
through which Los Zetas’ exceptionalism could emerge triumphant, seeping into the
fractures of state formation and globalization.
Los Zetas were born from the deserters of elite Mexican forces in 1997.11 They
were recruited by Osiel Cárdenas, leader of the Cártel del Golfo (CDG), who was
becoming increasingly paranoid of assassination12 and used Los Zetas to “seize
territory and dispatch rivals.”13 The group reportedly took its name from leader Arturo
Guzmán Decena’s military call sign (Z-1),14 and members of the organization assumed
their individual Zeta identities with an accompanying number, facilitating a more
cohesive group identity and militarized culture. A person who assumes the identity of a
letter and a number, becomes partially stripped of their individual identity, leaving space
for a collective identity where group mandates can assume control of the collectivized
self. In this way, the collective identity can be viewed as a method for subverting
individual identities.
Guzmán recruited an additional 30 members from Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas
Especiales (GAFE), offering better pay (Cárdenas offered new recruits $3000 to invest
in illicit commodities)15 in exchange for loyalty and obedience. Guzmán was born in
Puebla, Mexico in 1976 while Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, Z-3, was born on December
25, 1975, in the rural village of Apan, Hidalgo, Mexico. Lazcano joined the military at the
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age of seventeen, later gaining promotion to GAFE. While in the military, original
members such as Guzmán and Lazcano “completed specialized training in intelligence
collection, surveillance techniques, and operational planning,”16 creating a solid
foundation for their professionalization of violence within the criminal community.
Considering both Guzmán and Lazcano, Los Zetas’ leading members, both
come from areas of concentrated poverty, we can view their need for economic mobility,
a need that was not met by military service, as a primary motivator for deserting GAFE.
The military, then, can be viewed as a training ground and bridge for additional
economic expansion, a necessity that was influenced by rampant underdevelopment.
The economic and cultural alienation of the non-elite following globalization is partially
manifested in the continuing expansion of informal economic sectors and the
emergence of non-state actors such as Guzmán and Lazcano, who can be viewed as
progenies of economic policies. This is not an argument of linearity, but a thread in the
tapestry of causality.
Treviño Morales, Z-40, was born in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, around 1970
(there are varying records as to his year of birth) to a working-class family, and spent
his teenage years working “for the wealthy, cleaning yards, chimneys and cars,” all the
while detesting “Mexico’s de facto caste system, which pounded a sense of inferiority
into its poorer citizens.”17 During his teenage years, Z-40 migrated to Dallas, Texas,
where he encountered additional bias against the Latinx community, marginalized by
economics and ethnicity. Oscar Hagelsieb, assistant special agent in charge of the
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investigative unit of U.S. immigration and Customs enforcement in El Paso, says Z-40
“felt Mexican immigrants were discriminated against, that Americans were too
prejudiced against Mexican immigrants.”18 These grievances against a system Treviño
Morales felt was designed to subjugate left him enraged, and were echoed by his
family. Z-40’s older brother, Juan Francisco, moved to Texas in 1978, and worked as a
bricklayer. During his trial for marijuana distribution in 1995, Juan Francisco recalled
how he and Z-40 “’would work all week long, Saturdays and Sundays, sometimes
holidays. Sometimes in the whole month, there was barely a day off for us.’”19
The legacy of imperial hierarchies, partially manifested in the servitude and
exploitation of formerly colonized peoples, a new fluidity of the border, and increased
economic marginalization wrought through neoliberal policies, cannot create sadistic
“monsters” but it can become a factor in a person’s trajectory. The inability to compete
during globalization, as viewed through early members of Los Zetas, highlights the
discontinuity of the connective economic system, the paradox of globalization.
Transparent spaces for trade and exchange should provide mobility for now globalized
citizens, not simply the objects they transport. In the case of Treviño Morales and
Guzmán, an inverted narrative emerges whereby they, and others in similar
circumstances, were both limited and liberated in their movements and identities by the
fluidity of borders, leaving them to create mobility in the zone of inversion using the tools
of globalization. Z-40 directed a multitude of non-state actors to distribute violence
within the group’s territories, operating with near impunity throughout the state of
Tamaulipas. Without the consent of the group, especially considering their meritocratic
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structure, actors such as Z-40, who spread a unique brand of coercion, would not have
thrived within the syndicate. In short, the sadism of one leader can only spread through
support within the organization.
2.2 Structural Exceptionalism
In 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office in Little Rock, Arkansas,
requested a control file be opened to “maintain information pertaining to the Los Zetas
organization.”20 The communication categorizes the group as violent, heavily armed,
and a “highly structured Hispanic gang that operates in the fashion of a paramilitary
organization.”21 According to the report, members of GAFE who later became the
original members of Los Zetas “trained in the U.S. at the School of the Americas at Fort
Benning, GA,” and the “Zetas’ organizational structure includes counterintelligence,
intelligence and tactical enforcement units.”22 The recruitment of elite soldiers within
criminal organizations is integral to Los Zetas’ model, diffusing throughout TCOs in
Mexico. Establishing the extent to which criminal syndicates have recruited special
forces has proven difficult to quantify. According to political scientist Dr. CorreaCabrera, “It’s an inconvenient issue for the government, so they deny freedom-ofinformation requests,” but Mexico’s Ministry of Defence estimate 1,383 elite soldiers
deserted between 1994 and 2015.23 The militarization of criminal syndicates, formed in
part through training provided by the U.S. Government, not only illuminates the
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transnationalism of the group, but marks a clear divergence from previous criminal
syndicates who relied upon amateur protection. Furthermore, while traditional TCOs
employed a vertical hierarchy, fusing alliances through blood and marriage, Los Zetas
transitioned to a more decentralized structure.
In the old compadres system,24 mobility is attained not simply through blood and
marriage but through longstanding informal contracts, relying on the authoritarian PRI to
solidify power and protection through its network of players. The weakening of the PRI,
changing administrations, and the rapid growth of private capital fractured what was
once a stable system of impunity and collusion amongst powerful players. Political
scientist Jorge Chabat discusses the contention that the CDG’s decline, which occurred
after the arrest of Juan García Abrego in 1996, was “related to the fact that the Salinas
administration protected it, and that this protection vanished with the arrival of the
Zedillo administration.”25 Chabat makes it clear this speculation is impossible to prove,
but that Abrego testified during his trial that CDG had obtained illicit goods from
“seizures made by the attorney general’s office.”26
Los Zetas’ replication of fractures within state power can be viewed through their
organizational structure. While the group had an overarching militaristic culture, strong
leaders, and a collective identity, the organization allowed individual cells to operate
somewhat autonomously, exploiting resources and diversifying interests based on the
local environment. Their massive diversification of operations, a key divergence from
previous TCOs, included entry into activities such as “public corruption, alien smuggling,
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kidnapping, assault, murder extortion, and money laundering.”27 Instead of operating
through a centralized command structure, the group operated more like a franchise,28
using their unique brand, that of brutal and indiscriminate violence, to recruit and
subjugate, ensuring territories complied with taxation but also permitting variation.
The decentralization was compounded when Miguel Guzmán Decena (Z-1) was
killed during a shootout in November of 2002, and the structural void left by Guzmán
went unfilled. While Lazcano, Z-3, assumed some form of leadership within the
organization, Los Zetas “likely developed a more fluid structure with commanders roving
the South Texas border.”29 In effect, there were “few clear lines distinguishing between
full-fledged members, associates, and imitators”30 Thus, members who profited and
gained mobility by exploiting the more fluid border economy and the weakness of the
state, became more localized during their day-to-day activities. While the culture, or
blueprint, of Los Zetas remained intact, the structural shifts and decentralization
increased the group’s operative autonomy from CDG, anticipating their continuing
independence and eventual split from the alliance, known as the Company, that
occurred in 2010.
The localized approach allowed for more flexibility and is facilitated by a more
robust border economy following accelerated liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. As
the decentralization of state authority is replicated by Los Zetas, the fluidity within the
organizational structure exists in continuity with border regions. Diversification of profits
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through extortion of small business owners and informal economic actors is aided by
the informal economy that operates outside traditional economic structures, as Los
Zetas operate outside traditional organizational structures. The structure of Los Zetas,
then, can be viewed as contingent upon the structure of trade liberalization without
which the group would be trapped within a command economy and traditional
hierarchical structures.
2.3 Technology
Los Zetas’ proprietary radio network utilized technology in unique and modern
ways, illuminating the benefits advanced technology can offer criminal syndicates. In
2006, the organization began to construct a large-scale radio communication network
throughout the Gulf Coast states of Mexico, aiming to “establish a proprietary, real-time
communications infrastructure,”31 to gather intelligence and coordinate operations. The
operation was managed by Jose Luis Del Toro Estrada, a seemingly innocuous
shopkeeper who owned a radio equipment store in Texas until his arrest during an
extensive international law enforcement operation, known as “Project Reckoning.”
Estrada, known as El Tecníco, not only set up the radio network, the infrastructure
through which Los Zetas coordinated sophisticated operations, but he oversaw a secret
network of cameras through which the group could surveil Mexican officials and stash
houses. Carl Pike, head of the DEA Special Operations Division, asserts the technology
allowed the group to track operations as well as “Mexican Police, military, even U.S.
border-patrol agents.”32
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The radio network was preferable to cell phones so the group could operate in
areas outside cell networks and so they could switch frequencies to evade law
enforcement, garbling transmissions if necessary. In urban settings, such as Nuevo
Laredo, Estrada would have identified “unused frequencies to avoid interference from
the likes of taxi and truck drivers’ radio chatter.”33 After the frequencies were mapped,
they implemented the physical components of the network. Once the infrastructure was
constructed, they had a “command-and-control capacity,”34 with DEA agent Pike stating
the technology linked the members of Los Zetas and CDG (before they split) so that
halcones (lookouts) could contact commanders to evade the authorities. The
infrastructure illustrates a sophisticated use of technology that was not standard within
criminal syndicates and highlights Los Zetas use of apparatus normally reserved for the
state. The advanced system, which allowed for increased communications connectivity,
is a transgression of state territory, uniquely challenging sovereignty and paving the way
for other TCOs to utilize technology for the purpose of subversion.
2.4 Legacy of Militarization
Los Zetas’ transnational interactions become evident upon examination of the
group’s connection to Guatemalan Kaibiles, an elite special forces unit who are known
for their counterinsurgency skills. In 2005, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
reported Los Zetas were “using Kailbiles to train new members,” suggesting the Zeta
leadership, following heavy leadership losses, no longer had the internal capability to
train new recruits.35 DEA intelligence, too, concluded such transnational cooperation,
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reporting that a Zeta member, after their arrest on September 10, 2005, stated the
group “had recruited former Guatemalan Kailbiles to work with the Zetas and that the
Kailbiles were procuring firearms and grenades from Guatemala,”36 so Los Zetas could
expand territory. While intelligence documents assert anticorruption efforts in Mexico
had hampered the recruitment of Mexican military members by criminal syndicates, the
“Guatemalan military downsizing from 1994 through 2004 created a pool of special
forces-trained candidates for the Zetas to draw on to train new Zeta members or offset
personnel shortfalls.”37 Mexican intelligence reached similar conclusions with regards to
the Zeta-Kaibil connection, with Mexican Attorney General Santiago asserting the need
for Kaibil training was due to a stream of arrests of original Zeta members.38
The Kaibiles, who were instrumental in quelling guerillas during the 36-year Civil
War (1960-1996) in Guatemala, and who were known for human rights violations, were
heavily impacted by budget cuts and had few alternatives to military life after 1996. Of
the 6,000 Kaibiles the Guatemalan Army has trained since 1975, approximately 360
were still active in 2011.39 Privates earned 250 dollars a month, with Kaibiles garnering
a bonus of thirty-eight dollars for transportation expenses. In contrast, Zeta recruiters
offered 2,000 dollars a month to work for the organization.40 Like the original Zeta
members, who were drawn to illegal economic sectors to facilitate growth, the
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downsizing of the Guatemalan military facilitated a similar outcome, with trained
members of the military migrating to TCOs, highlighting the unintended consequences
of military deconstruction. When you combine advanced training, a robust military
culture, and little hope of economic mobility, especially considering the instability
wrought through the Civil War, we find motivation for TCO migration.
When expanding their territory, Los Zetas were known to use propaganda to
“alert and warn the local population”41 that they were operating in the region. These
alerts were also used to recruit new members from the military. For instance, in one
Mexican town, Los Zetas used a banner to promise new members “three square meals
a day, in lieu of ramen noodles,” reportedly a “staple in the Mexican military.”42
The propaganda not only offers a more lucrative lifestyle but illuminates the state’s
inability to provide adequate sustenance for its agents. Compared to previous criminal
syndicates in Mexico, the tactic more thoroughly utilizes propaganda to expand and
coerce, while simultaneously exploiting the economic marginalization of military
members. The strategies for expansion, most notably extreme forms of violent coercion,
likewise illuminates the inability of the state, decentralized like the zeta cells, to uphold
the public safety of its citizens, arguably the state’s principal responsibility.
To better understand linkages between militarization and Los Zetas, it is crucial
to examine militarization in Latin America during the Cold War. Specifically, it is
important to explore U.S. interventions and complicity in the militarization of right-wing
authoritarian regimes. To mitigate the spread of communism, and solidify U.S. power
within the continent, the U.S. destabilized governments in Guatemala, El Salvador,
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Nicaragua, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and British Guiana (Guyana),
between 1945 and 1989.43 These interventions occurred despite the fact there was little
evidence to support international connections between the Soviet Union and leftist
movements in Latin America. Historians argue interventions were less related to
communism and more related to colonial predilections and the desire to “maintain
peace and stability, exclude foreign influences, expand U.S. trade and investment, and
shape Latin America’s political, sociological, and ideological development.”44
U.S. intervention in Guatemala during the 1950s and the decision to destabilize
the constitutional government of Guatemala had devastating consequences for people
living in the region. During the four decades of violent upheaval, at least two hundred
thousand people would die. The conflict served as laboratory for the CIA who developed
strategies to combat insurgents and included psychological warfare and the infiltration
of labor unions and student groups. These tools of U.S. hegemony would be used
throughout the continent during the Cold War.45 Furthermore, U.S. support of death
squads sent a message to other leftist organizations that the U.S. would not support
democratic change by socialist factions, leaving violent revolution as the only path to
victory. When human rights violations occurred, the U.S. argued Latin America was
inherently violent due to the region’s culture and history. For instance, a U.S. State
Department study in 1986 examining state terror argued Guatemala was simply a
violent society, neglecting the socioeconomic disparity formed through colonial and Cold
War endeavors. Similarly, Los Zetas’ violent acts and human rights violations are
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framed as inherent to Mexican culture rather than a production of historical factors such
as militarization during the Cold War.
In a January 4, 1966, Agency for International Development (AID) cable, for
instance, U.S. Public Safety Advisor John Longan, who was selected to assist the
Government of Guatemala’s (GOG) “law enforcement authorities on techniques and
methods for combatting terrorists, kidnapping, and extortion tactics,”46 details the plan to
assist the GOG in counter-insurgency tactics, both covert and overt, immediate and
long-range. Included in these plans, was immediate raids in Guatemala City, where
police forces “were given detailed instructions on how to seal off given areas” to force
communists out of hiding and into the hands of the authorities.47 During the covert
phase, the GOG was instructed to set up a safe house where all information regarding
subversive activities was to be sent to avoid communist penetration.
In Guatemala, July 1968, the CIA was informed by an undisclosed source that
due to concerns over “unfavorable publicity of past counter-insurgency operations,”
going forward any insurgents “killed by Guatemalan security forces must appear to have
died in an armed encounter, regardless of the manner in which actually died.”48 What’s
more, a judge was to be called to validate the narrative of the “encounter whenever
possible.”49 It is within this space of transnational complicity, where the military was
weaponized against popular uprisings, that the Kaibiles, along with their specific brand
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of violence, evolved. A perfect storm emerged whereby the Kaibiles, highly trained and
stripped of economic autonomy by demilitarization, became poised to collaborate with
Los Zetas, who were likewise born from the U.S.-trained GAFE, also used in quelling
leftist insurgencies, specifically in Chiapas in 1994. In this way, the U.S. Cold War policy
coupled with the marginalization of globalization, birthed revised TCO structures and
operational capacity.
The Zeta-Kaibil connection confirms the transnational repercussions of
militarization. In post-Cold War conflicts, state militarization has had a multitude of
consequences in regions that have a heavy TCO presence. Critics assert when the
military suppresses social movements “it becomes difficult to distinguish between the
force employed to combat organized crime and that directed at social protest.” 50 Similar
to the way democratization of both the state and markets connects to the structure of
Los Zetas, militarization connects to Los Zetas’ methods for coercion and control.
Militarization fostered the culture and training for original Zeta members and remains a
powerful force in the group’s organizational and social evolution.
2.5 Forms of Coercion
The extreme forms of violence utilized by Los Zetas transformed the landscape
within criminal organizations, but can we, as outlined by Koonings,51 characterize this as
a new form of violence, and how much does this diverge from the ideologically
motivated violence that dominated the Cold War period? In short, is there a significant
categorical shift in forms of violence? During a 2018 Wilson Center discussion on Los
Zetas, analysist Steven Dudley engaged with socially and economically motivated
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violence, arguing that Los Zetas may not be a political organization, but their
expressions of power are nevertheless incredibly political.52 It is true that the
organization may not be politically motivated but they are, in fact, politically influenced,
forged through political context, including the Cold War, global economic policies, and
state formation, and the outcomes of their actions are extremely political, so their
actions can be categorized as political. Like most TCOs, Los Zetas are largely driven by
the desire for economic and social mobility. This can be viewed as a replication of
economic liberalization as well as a reaction to economic marginalization, part of the
new model of violence. The experience of Treviño Morales, working in servitude for the
needs of the wealthy was not unique, and while this cannot be framed as causality for
Los Zetas’ participation in violent criminality, it can be understood as, by nature, a
political experience.
Von Clausewitz argues war is a continuation of the political,53 and while the
irregular warfare utilized by Los Zetas falls outside traditional ideological conflict, these
forms of violence are clearly a challenge to state authority and a political expression
with significant consequences. These challenges are often manifested in confrontations
with state agents. In 2006 and 2007, according to a DEA cable, Los Zetas increased
direct confrontations with the Mexican military, executing public officials on multiple
occasions.54 For instance, on December 14, 2007, two soldiers were assassinated after
they had participated in an operation that resulted in the seizure of seven tons of

Steven Dudley, “Los Zetas, Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War in Mexico”
(discussion, Wilson Center, Washington D.C., February 13, 2018), accessed on November 14,
2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/los-zetas-inc-criminal-corporations-energy-and-civilwar-mexico.
53
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
54
DEA, Los Zetas (2001-2009).
52

30

marijuana.55 While challenges to state authority are not unique to Los Zetas, the
characteristics of the organization, including their decentralized structure, militaristic
culture, indiscriminate violence, among other idiosyncrasies, magnifies their challenges
in unique ways, presenting a new context for such defiance.
In 2004, after posing as “Mexican soldiers and federal agents in military vehicles,
approximately 40 armed Zetas broke into the Apatzingán prison in Michoacán,
Mexico.”56 The interaction challenges the authority of the state on multiple levels. While
the military uniforms were worn as a disguise to avoid detection, the “disguise” can be
interpreted as an infiltration of state power where the lines of legitimacy are blurred
beyond recognition. If the state no longer has the power or authority to secure its
prisoners and thus ensure public safety, the disguise becomes reality within the space
of legitimate authority. Additionally, the elements of corruption within police forces can
be viewed as a method to transfer authority to TCOs.
In Nuevo Laredo in 2005, the infiltration of the organization into the local police
force was so widespread, with the FBI asserting that “until June 2005, Los Zetas
effectively controlled the police force,”57 that the Mexican State sent federal forces into
Nuevo Laredo to retain control of the city. Former legitimate agents of the state, Los
Zetas, collaborating with current legitimate agents of the state, all while assuming the
identity and culture of the military, creates confusion within the public sphere. Thus, the
public is thrust into a realm of statelessness, where multiple actors with authority exert
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control. In this way, the public, reacting to multiple agents of authority, assumes a
degree of autonomy, where they exist outside the control of a single authority.
When agents of the state did not submit to the group’s authority, the
consequences could be dire. This was the case on June 7, 2005, when Nuevo Laredo
Police Chief Alejandro Dominguez Coello was murdered hours after he was sworn in.
Fifty-six-year-old Coello, who was formerly the head of the Nuevo Laredo Chamber of
Commerce, spoke to reporters about his decision to take a job many deemed not worth
the risk, declaring, “I’m not beholden to anyone. My commitment is to the citizenry,” and
“those who should be afraid are those who have been compromised.”58 Hours later, the
new chief was fired upon as he “climbed into his Ford pickup.”59 The agency of Coello
and his quest to ensure justice in the face of widespread impunity 60 illustrates the
inability of the state to ensure the safety of its agents. Considering the local police force
was heavily infiltrated by TCOs, the exchange also illuminates continuous fractures
within protective sectors of government.
2.6 Replication of Structure
The replication of Los Zetas’ structures and culture is crucial to the contention
that the group represents a turning point in the trajectory of criminal organizations in
Mexico. La Familia Michoacana (LFM) is a notable example of the replication of the
Zeta model but like any reproduction it is full of modifications and idiosyncrasies.
Criminal enterprise in Michoacán, which is home to a large population of rural farmers,
was under the control of El Milenio, which was under the control of its parent
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organization in Tijuana, when fractures within alliances prompted Los Zetas to assume
power in the region in 2003.61
Los Zetas, “good teachers but bad landlords,”62 trained former Milenio members
in their brand of irregular warfare to disrupt Tijuana and expand into a region key to the
cultivation of marijuana and the poppy. Familia worked in collaboration with Los Zetas to
overthrow the traditional crime family in Michoacán, the Valencias, illustrating a modern
alliance that sought to overthrow the “pre-modern” system that relied on lineage. LFM,
however, became increasingly agitated by Los Zetas, viewing the group as a disruptive
presence in the region. The inter-alliance conflict exemplifies the ability of Los Zetas to
export their model within Mexico but their inability to do so without modifications.
Eventually, and after significant conflict, the LFM were able to successfully expel
Los Zetas from Michoacán, expanding to Guerrero, Morelos, Guanajuato, Queretaro,
Jalisco, and Mexico City. LFM’s use of modern marketing techniques recalls the
propaganda of Los Zetas, especially their use of banners. Combined with their use of
extreme violence, LFM can be viewed as the offspring of Los Zetas. In September of
2006, for instance, LFM announced their “existence”63 into the arena of criminal
organizations by reproducing Los Zetas’ coercive methods of spectacular violence and
propaganda. “After firing a round of shots into the air, they ordered the patrons to lie on
their stomachs, tore open a plastic bag, and tossed five severed heads across the
floor.”64 Once the heads were on the floor, the group differentiated themselves from Los
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Zetas through a banner that read, “’La Familia doesn’t kill for money; it doesn’t kill
women; it doesn’t kill innocent people; only those who deserve to die, die. Everyone
should know…this is divine justice.’”65 From their first act as an official organization, the
group frames their work as a protective element, fusing the methods of Zetas with a
paternal air of security.
Jean Franco proposes the dead body, when mutilated, can be transformed into
objects and used as “messages for the civilian population or the enemy,” 66 claiming acts
where the logic of the killer is clear are “expressive crimes.”67 During the nightclub
incident, LFM’s expressive crime implicitly communicates their alliance with Los Zetas,
by now their mortal enemy, in that their form of coercion is aligned with the methods
employed by Los Zetas, that they are willing to take extreme measures to challenge
rivals. LFM makes clear, however, that they diverge from Los Zetas by assuming a
moral code that prohibits the murder of “innocents” in the battle for territory and
sovereignty. While both LFM and the Zetas used propaganda and the human body as
expressive acts of power, and are thus political, LFM transcends the precedent set by
Zetas in that they align themselves with forms of justice and Christianity. In fact, the
group’s use of beheading elevated Zeta coercive techniques, and illuminates LFM’s
utilization of expressive criminality, leaving Los Zetas to call the group “radical
Islamists,” driven “crazy by ice.”68
The group, therefore, like any successful protégé, takes the Zetas’ most effective
methodology, that of spectacular, if violent, coercion, and fuses it with morality as
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justification for its actions. The LFM model, while continuing to challenge the state and
illuminate its deficits, fills the vacuum of state power by funding “food and medicine,
public works projects, and low interest loans”69 to the economically marginalized
population of Michoacán. While many criminal organizations have been known to
provide social programs to the public, acting as a proto-welfare state, LFM created
infrastructure in the region not previously implemented by TCOs, including rehabilitation
centers for populations suffering from substance abuse (there is evidence to suggest
this was a recruiting tool for LFM). NAFTA and the 2008-10 recession left people living
in areas such as Lazaro, Cardenas, Morelia “uprooted from their families, unemployed,
poorly educated, and homeless.”70 Other forms of governance provided by the LFM
include “regulating the prices of agricultural products and establishing harvesting
periods, giving licenses for forestry activities, giving permits for festivals and religious
events.”71 Weakness within bureaucratic and political institutions, especially glaring in
Michoacán where access to social services within low-income communities was
inadequate, created a space through which LFM could expand operations.
LFM frames this form of governance as protection, recalling the inability of the
state to ensure the safety and prosperity of its citizens. After the group’s spiritual leader,
Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, was supposedly killed in a military operation in 2010 (he
was, in fact, not killed until 2014), the public reaction was mixed. During a march for
peace following the operation, “some protestors held signs saying, “Viva la Familia,”
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and “Nazario will always live in our hearts.”72 While it was reported that the protestors
were planted by LFM, the interaction shows the contradictory reactions of the public.
State officials likewise showed support for LFM, with the mayor of Apatzingán declaring,
“La Familia does not cause violence, the government does.”73 While popular support for
Los Zetas in Tamaulipas or Michoacán was virtually nonexistent, the mixed reaction of
the public following the death of Nazario may be an indication that LFM was successful
at adopting the Zeta model in effective ways, exhibiting the group’s ability to synthesize
modern and traditional methods to solidify power.
2.7 Challenges
The structural decentralization of Los Zetas allowed for increased mobility when
operating locally, and the group’s diversification was a significant factor in their
economic growth, both components of their exceptionalism. The recruitment of highly
trained members, however, became challenging as military operations often resulted in
the arrest or death of original Zetas. In short, the decentralized and horizontal model
was a contributing factor for the organization’s rapid ascent as well as their decline.
While there was a high barrier for entry into traditional criminal organizations, you must
be entrenched within the vertical hierarchy by birth or other longstanding alliance, the
low barrier for entry for Los Zetas proved a catastrophic liability in the end.74
To expand, Los Zetas had to recruit from below, outside the military model, which
led to the monopolization of local resources, as local actors, much like unregulated
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capitalism, extorted beyond sustainable parameters. While groups such as LFM
reframed local extortion in terms of protection, Los Zetas never pivoted from their
aggressive extortive patterns, depleting the local economy of its meager resources, and
fomenting dissent and hostility within local populations. The extreme coercive tactics of
the group simultaneously ignited loathing from traditional criminal syndicates, the
government, and the public against their common enemy. From a security perspective,
the high value targeting strategy utilized by the military against Los Zetas proved a
success story. In general, however, the “kingpin strategy” has been viewed as an
abysmal failure by analysts who favor a more complicated policy of coordinated middlelevel targeting.75
Eventually, the once powerful organization would fragment beyond recognition.
Lazcano, or Z-3, was allegedly killed by Mexican security forces in Coahuila in October
of 2012, his body quickly disappeared. The disappearance of Lazcano marks a moment
when the fragmentation of the organization accelerated dramatically.76 Los Zetas
proved exceptional in their model, but this was not due to the sadistic qualities of the
group’s leaders or the inherent violence of its members. Instead, Los Zetas’ evolution
was deeply rooted in complex social and historical factors, including militarization and
globalization, that created an environment conducive for a new brand of criminality.
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Chapter 3
Impunity and Opposition
In 2011, the Mexican municipality of Allende became the locus of Los Zetas’
retribution and an example of the rampant criminal impunity within local governments.
After the DEA leaked the fact that they had secured the cell phone personal
identification numbers of Zeta leaders Miguel Trevino Morales (Z-40) and his brother
Omar, both of whom lived in Allende, to Mexican security forces, the brothers
erroneously traced the leak to longtime Allende resident and Zeta ally Jose Luis Garza,
Jr., a rancher whose family had deep roots in the region.1 Beginning on the evening of
March 18, 2011, residents noticed large groups of outsiders streaming into the
municipality, prompting many locals to hunker down in the otherwise quiet town. Retired
government worker Guadalupe Garcia recalls eating at a local restaurant when two
young men came in to order some fifty hamburgers to go.2 What may seem an
innocuous event triggered a sense of foreboding in Garcia, who trusted her intuition and
decided to head home.3 The streets remained deserted that night, and over the next
three days Los Zetas waged a war on the residents of Allende, kidnapping, murdering,
and burning the bodies of up to 300 people.
Many of the victims were handed over to Los Zetas by local police and had no
ties to criminal organizations. The massacre embodies the indiscriminate violence
utilized by Los Zetas and the impunity through which they operated, but it also highlights
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the multidirectional exchange of violence and the culture of resistance within Mexico.
The official investigation stalled for years, leaving vast amounts of evidence, including
bone and tooth fragments, to sit undisturbed in the ashes of abandoned ranches.4 In
2014, however, a more robust investigation ensued, and a special task force was
established.5 The investigation was prompted in large part by investigative journalism in
Mexico and the United States as well as external pressures from human rights
organizations.
The abundance of compelling testimony that came from the investigation was a
powerful tool for substantive change, illuminating the importance of activism in the fight
against criminal organizations. While human rights violations in Mexico are often viewed
as a unidirectional interaction, the multidirectional impact of testimony and acts of
resistance, often obscured by violence, emerge apparent in the case of Allende.
The massacres in Allende and Tamaulipas are viewed within the framework of
victimhood but an equally significant component of the interaction deals with how the
disconnection between crime and justice has led to a more robust discourse on
criminality and fueled resistance within personal and media spaces. To better
understand the genesis of resistance to Los Zetas, this chapter will first establish
historical linkages between TCO opposition, the Dirty War in Guerrero, and the
democratization of Mexico.
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3.1 Resistance in Guerrero
Chapter 3 examined the transnational interaction between Los Zetas and the
Kaibiles, arguing their alignment was connected to a shared military culture and
demilitarization post-1996. The Mexican Dirty War, similarly, illuminates the interaction
between violent political repression, a culture of popular resistance, and popular
opposition to criminal organizations. The Dirty War in Guerrero, specifically, and the
conflict between the state and leftist guerillas Genaro Vazquez, of the National
Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR), and Lucio Cabañas, of the Party of the Poor,
provides a window through which to view Los Zetas professionalization of violence and
military culture, as well as their replication of state repression. Simultaneously, the
resistance of the Guerrerense anticipates the acts of opposition in the face of Zeta
coercion.
During the late 1960s and 1970s, Cabañas and Vázquez led a series of attacks
in the mountains of Guerrero, arguing the promises of the 1910 Revolution had fallen
woefully short of its goals and the people of Guerrero had suffered the consequences.
Historian O’Neill Blacker argues that while Mexico had a relatively successful revolution,
with the government implementing social welfare programs and President Cárdenas
initiating agrarian land reform, it was “the government’s failure to fulfill their potential,
rather than demands for creation, that led to popular discontent.”6 Mexico outwardly
supported international socialist revolutions, including those in Chile and Cuba, but
stood opposed to internal policy changes that would meaningfully alter inequities. The
contradictions of Mexico, including its stance on international revolutions, served as a
O’Neill Blacker, "Cold War in the Countryside: Conflict in Guerrero, Mexico," The Americas 66,
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façade that “masked internal policies”7 that promoted state-sponsored human rights
violations and the violent repression of popular uprisings. In other words, the PRI’s
consolidation of power took precedence over revolutionary values.
During the 1960s, Guerrero became an epicenter of racial and economic
disparity, ranking among the poorest states in Mexico.8 The “Mexican Miracle,” in which
the PRI consolidated power and assisted Allies during WWII by developing industrial
sectors to support war efforts, was only a miracle for a select few and a gap in wealth
dramatically increased for Mexico’s poorest fifty percent.9 For the campesino, many of
whom farmed coffee and coconuts, earning a living wage became challenging when the
government cut credits to peasant organizations in 1955.10 By the late 1960s,
approximately 62 percent of Guerrerense were illiterate,11 and between 1960 and 1970
unemployment increased by 487 percent.12
Both Lucio Cabañas and Genaro Vázquez began their paths to insurgency as
educators and activists, working within a more traditional system of dissent. Teachers in
the region headed social welfare programs, playing “instrumental roles in community
life, furthering local improvements, intervening in relations with government, and in the
generation after World War II, organizing movements for greater democracy and
accountability in state and municipal politics.”13 As prominent activists, both Cabañas
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and Vazquez led electoral efforts and organized opposition parties.14 In the face of
popular opposition, however, the state became increasingly intent on militarization and
repression. The authoritarian state was focused on continuing its hegemony and
subverting revolutionary values rather than making policy changes that would address
systemic inequities.
In December of 1962, police fired upon Vázquez and a group of protesters during
a sit-in outside the municipal palace in Iguala, “killing seven and injuring twenty-three.”15
In 1967, during a protest in Atoyac, Cabañas and fellow protestors were also fired upon,
killing several people, including Cabañas’s brother. “Facing a regime that repeatedly
punished legal forms of pacific dissent and protest with violence,”16 both Vázquez and
Cabañas sought justice outside the legal framework. The actions of the rebels represent
a pattern in Mexico that can be viewed within the work of activists in Allende and
Tamaulipas. The public, accustomed to the state’s inability to fulfill promises and ensure
public safety, is forced to seek justice within marginalized zones.
During a press conference, Secretary Hermenegildo Cuenca Diaz, an architect of
Dirty War policies, justified militarization, declaring “neither in the state of Guerrero nor
in any part of the republic are there guerillas. Persons who rob and kill are not guerillas,
they are bandits.”17 The PRI, “a national regime self-proclaimed as the “revolution
turned into government,”18 refused to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the
Guerrerense, that people were starving, that the state was not upholding its
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responsibility, and instead rapidly militarized the region, sending 12,000 troops by 1971
and more than double that amount by 1974.19 The history of militarization and human
rights violations by the state sets a precedent for Los Zetas, who are trained within this
culture.
During the early 1970s, those displaced from traditional regions of dissent carried
out a series of attacks against the Mexican elite, including the kidnapping of Senator
Ruben Figueroa, who was a close friend of President Echeverria and the
administration’s choice for governor of Guerrero. Echeverria outwardly refused to
negotiate with “criminals” (even though Senator Figueroa later told a reporter a twentyfive-million-peso ransom, or two million U.S. dollars, was negotiated for his release),
sending “16,000 soldiers—about one third of the Mexican Army”20 to Guerrero. Figueroa
was “rescued” by the military in September 1974, months after the initial kidnapping in
May. Cabañas was not captured during the raid, but the military pressure following the
string of high-profile kidnappings and assassinations proved fatal for the leader, who, on
December 2, 1974, was killed in a shootout with the military.21
While the life of Cabañas ended in 1974, the trauma of violence, as well as the
impunity with which the state exerted its power remains in continuity with Mexican
identity. In 2006, special prosecutors leaked their report on the Dirty War to the public.
Investigators concluded that between the 1960s and 1980s, President Echeverria
ordered a genocide in Guerrero and directed Secretary Hermenegildo Cuenca Diaz to
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execute his plan. The military was ordered to kidnap, torture, and kill suspected
subversives, with entire villages suspected of supporting Cabañas (mostly located in
Ayotzinapa) destroyed.22 The soldiers “rounded up all the men and boys, executed
some on the spot and detained others,” using rape, torture, beatings, electric shock, and
the forced ingestion of gasoline to repress the uprising.23 Upon entering office in 2000,
President Fox promised a more transparent state, declaring “No society can tolerate
excesses and wrongs committed against human rights,”24 and while Fox and
democratization had a role in the continuing investigations, it is activism outside the
state that pushed for transparency and justice.
The patterns solidified during the Dirty War are echoed in towns such as Allende
on multiple levels. First, and most obviously, Los Zetas are the concrete result of the
authoritarian militarization that flourished under U.S. Cold War interventions. Much like
the military was directed to indiscriminately kidnap, torture, and kill whole villages in
Ayotzinapa regardless of personal affiliation with Cabañas, everyone in Allende was
subject to punishment by Los Zetas, regardless of involvement with the organization.
Cesar Alfonso Garcia Ramirez was one such man. Garcia was friends with Everardo
Elizondo, who worked at the Garza ranch and raised fighting cocks.25 Both men drove
to the ranch on the night of March 18 to get medicine for a cockfight scheduled for that
night. Garcia’s wife, Etelvina Rodriguez, became alarmed when her husband did not
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respond to phone calls. The next morning Rodriguez drove by the ranch and noticed
groups of hooded men with black vests and rifles.26 As she drove back to Allende,
Rodriguez took a second look inside the ranch and noticed a pile of bodies next to a
burning building. Past the entrance she saw Allende municipal police trucks and armed
people she recognized as the police guarding the area.27 Like the atrocities of the Dirty
War, the state was not enthusiastic about transparency, and did not want to illuminate
the complicity of local officials in the murder of up to 300 people (the total population of
Allende was only around 23,000). Evidence sat undisturbed for years without adequate
investigation, requiring the media and survivor testimony, both mechanisms outside the
traditional Mexican justice system, to illuminate the massacre.
For Cabañas and Vázquez, the failure of the state to fulfill its promises, and its
violent repression of legal protest, was viewed as an illegitimate and criminal act against
the population, requiring extralegal forms of opposition. The complicity of the police in
Allende can similarly be viewed as a criminal act against the population, requiring action
outside an illegitimate local government. For survivors of the Guerrero conflict, a robust
public discourse on the criminality of the state and the “structural culture of impunity”28
became essential for securing justice for the 1200 disappeared29 as well as their
families who suffered the trauma of militarization. The pattern of criminal impunity and
state complicity recalls the certainty that the justice system “only punished those that did
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not have the means to circumvent justice,”30 prompting the public to seek justice
autonomously.
The search for transparency can thus be viewed as a mechanism for true
democratization and justice. For Tita Radilla, whose father Rosendo Radilla was
disappeared while stopped at a checkpoint on August 25, 1974, the quest to find out
what happened that day has been integral to justice. Radilla took her case to the
Interamerican Human Rights Court, securing a victory against the Mexican State in
2009.31 Radilla also founded an advocacy group, The Association of Families of
Detained and Disappeared Victims of Human Rights Violations in Mexico (AFADEM),
an organization that not only advocates for people affected by the Dirty War but for
those forcibly disappeared today, either by transnational criminal organizations, the
military, or a combination thereof. Like Radilla, the media and survivors of the Allende
massacre understood the state would not willingly investigate the murders without
external pressure and advocated for truth outside the state. It is within this space of
autonomy that a clear line between the Dirty War and Allende exists.
3.2 Democratization
The election of Vicente Fox of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) marked the
official democratization of Mexico, which had operated under the relatively stable yet
authoritarian PRI for a staggering seventy-one years. The process of democratization,
however, began long before the election of President Fox, and is inextricably linked to
Mexico’s rich history of opposition. During his speech on December 2, 2000, Fox
offered a new vision, one that lived up to the ideals of Mexico’s revolutionary past,
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declaring, “I differ radically from the old view that power is not to be shared. I will share
power, and also the responsibilities. I am the guardian of power, not its owner.32
Fox promised a more transparent and participatory system, one that would
illuminate the moral failings of the past. In 2002, the president demanded the
secretariats of the interior and the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA) turn
over all Mexican Dirty War records to the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) located
in the infamous Lecumberri, a former Mexico City prison that had housed Mexico’s
political prisoners from the 1950s to the 1970s.33 While the election in 2000 represents
official democratization, an examination of the process of democratization is essential to
understanding the framework through which resistance and activism evolved. Mexican
systems of governance were not static entities but constantly evolving processes. The
2000 election, therefore, can be viewed as a marker of a more equitable distribution of
powers that are continually developing.
In 1977, President Jose Lopez Portillo allowed for the registration of new political
parties, including that of the Mexican Communist Party. 34 Portillo’s move was strategic;
he wasn’t necessarily interested in democratization but sought to uphold the legitimacy
and hegemony of the PRI, who had “looked distinctly undemocratic during the 1976
presidential election,” when its candidate had run unopposed.35 The PRI was in a
unique political position. Their continuing dominance was of the utmost concern, but the
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culture of revolutionary values that permeated the society always loomed large,
threatening to explode as it did during the Guerrero conflict and notably during the
Tlatelolco massacre in 1968. Push the leftists too far, and the stability of the PRI would
topple, causing economic catastrophe. What’s more, the state needed to maintain a
facade of equity else they would be the subject of intense international criticism. Thus,
the policy change was an optical illusion, a sweet spot of sorts, designed to ward off
critics and “co-opt an angry and articulate leftist movement that accused the PRI of
betraying its revolutionary roots.”36 While candidates had no hope of competing within a
political system designed in favor of the PRI, it allowed the public a sense of inclusion,
cracking the door of democracy, without permitting substantive change.
The PRI deftly walked the line of political acceptability, permitting opposition
through minute policy changes without tipping the balance of power.37 The allowance of
oppositional inroads, while necessary for a semblance of national and international
legitimacy, eventually gave way to oppositional power on the local level. The PRI-state
could not hold the line forever, and parties such as the PAN slowly and methodically
chipped away at PRI power. Although the opposition parties were “rarely allowed to win
on an electoral playing field skewed by the PRI-state,”38 small concessions, outside
formal electoral institutions and through informal bargaining tables, resolved
simultaneously “in the streets and in the courtrooms,”39 ultimately benefitting opposition
parties. Often these acts of dissent involved protracted and public battles, including sit-
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ins outside, or even inside, municipal buildings. Battles such as these often took years
to resolve, siphoning energy from the PRI, and while they only resulted in small victories
within local elections, the oppositional victories were still a voice for dissent and a path
to secure information about the PRI.40 While the process of democratization was
incremental and required years of patience and determination, Todd Eisenstadt argues
it was an “exemplar protracted transition.”41
The culture of dissent, without which democratization may have looked very
different, exists in continuity with the culture of opposition to Los Zetas. Authoritarianism
pushed the public into the margins of governmental participation, and change required
that they doggedly persevere in the face of injustice. The PAN victory in 2000 can be
traced back to the 1980s. During the economic catastrophe of the 1980s, elites became
weary of the economic stagnation, and began supporting the Partido Accion Nacional
(PAN) in state and local elections. While Mexican presidents still selected their
successors, in a practice known as the dedazo, business groups hoped the rightist PAN
could force change within the local political system. Then in 1988, Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas, the son of beloved President Lazaro Cárdenas, who had been a champion of
agrarian land reform, ran for president. When it looked like Cárdenas might win the
election, the PRI took steps to prevent the victory. Access to the election results were
abruptly halted “due to computer failure,”42 ballots were burned, and Carlos Salinas was
declared president of Mexico.
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After the election results were announced, Cárdenas contested the results,
declaring the “government and the president of the republic offered clean elections and
respect for the will of the people, but since July 6, the people are being trampled, the
law is being violated, and now we are in the final phase of the consummation of an
enormous electoral fraud.”43 During a stunning demonstration of public outrage,
exemplifying patterns of opposition, 200,000 people marched on the National Palace to
protest voter fraud. Citizens decried the departure from revolutionary values, with
protest banners declaring Salinas’s economic policies had created rampant poverty,
further marginalizing those not entrenched within the Mexican elite. Protestors argued
the PRI and Salinas brought hunger and hardship44 rather than the promised growth.
While Cárdenas asked his followers to exercise legal political pressure rather than
violent opposition to uphold the election results,45 the legacy of Mexico’s revolutionary
culture infiltrated the movement and Cárdenas supporters threatened insurrection,
declaring revolutionary heroes like Jose Maria Morelos and Emiliano Zapata were
sources of inspiration.46
With intensifying globalization and the weakening of central state power, 1994
became a turbulent year for Mexico. It was the year NAFTA was implemented by
President Salinas, the year PRI candidate Donaldo Colosio was assassinated, and the
year of the Chiapas Rebellion, which rapidly caused instability. All this marked the
beginning of the remarkable Zedillo presidency. Zedillo, an economist educated at
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Yale,47 continued to implement neoliberal reforms begun by Salinas, declaring the
reform process would continue even in the face of internal opposition by the PRI. During
his inauguration speech, Zedillo criticized the corruption of the Salinas administration
(Salinas endured the speech and criticism with stoicism), declaring the poorest
Mexicans were not treated fairly. Zedillo committed the administration to fighting
monopolistic practices that marginalized the majority of Mexicans.48 Ironically,
liberalization, as discussed in Chapter 2, further marginalized the poor, but also
contributed to PRI fragmentation. For instance, Zedillo made a concerted effort to
appoint members of his cabinet that were poised to continue the economic reforms of
Salinas (he appointed the chief NAFTA negotiator Herminio Blanco as the commerce
secretary). Zedillo also appointed a member of the opposition party PAN as the attorney
general.
While the 1917 Mexican Constitution was far from static, decentralization of
presidential power and changes to the Mexican Supreme did accelerate under
President Zedillo. After the creation of the National Party (later known as the PRI) in
1929, a monopoly of political power was centralized within the executive branch. The
control was rooted in the PRI’s dominance over the electoral process and their control
over Congress, the state legislatures, and state gubernatorial offices.49 The judicial
branch, restricted by the power of presidential appointment, did not challenge
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presidential authority and Congress was likewise beholden to the will of the presidency.
This system of presidential control, known as the presidencialismo, was noticeably in
decline during the presidency of Zedillo. A revised separation of powers became
apparent when in 1997 the PRI lost control of the Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de
Diputados). President Zedillo was still able to pass a significant amount of legislation,
but the loss of power reflected the shift of legislative power toward Congress, and an
overall decentralization of the executive branch.50
The anti-corruption agenda was an important component of the Zedillo
Administration’s agenda. In a bold move, the new president asked for the resignation of
all 26 Supreme Court justices. Zedillo, through his anti-corruption policies, liberalization,
and election finance laws, accelerated the process of democratization, resulting in
fractures within the political and social fabric of Mexico. Zedillo made a final striking
move at the end of his presidency by publicly congratulating Fox on his electoral victory,
ensuring a smooth transition of power and the democratization of Mexico. Years of
entrenched alliances were slowly and methodically losing power, the consequences of
which were manifested in groups such as Los Zetas. The authoritarian system had been
oppressive but relatively stable, using targeted coercion to secure power.
Ultimately, the process of democratization, along with a longstanding culture of
impunity and the aggressive policies of President Calderón starting in 2006, would
facilitate Los Zetas’ detachment from traditional systems of order that had been stable
under authoritarianism. This detachment would have dire consequences for the people
of Tamaulipas and Coahuila—migrants and media alike. The process of
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democratization also provided a small space for the public to access systems of
governance, as seen during the opening of the Dirty War records in 2002. While there
was an increased space for access and participation, the culture of impunity, as
witnessed in Allende, remained firmly entrenched within local systems of governance.
After the Allende massacre, the public expected the state to conceal crimes from the
public and shirk the responsibility of an investigation. Local police had after all
participated in the crimes, blurring the line between legitimate and illegitimate actors.
When considering the dramatic increase in crime following the period of
democratization, questions naturally arise. For instance, what connection exists
between democratization and criminality? The decentralization of executive power and
the ultimate triumph of democratization did not solve deeper issues concerning public
faith in the electoral process. The PRI’s long history of electoral fraud undermined the
legitimacy of state institutions, creating uncertainty within the public sphere. This
instability and uncertainty motivated criminal organizations to expand operations and fill
vacuums of power. Sociologist Andrés Villarreal examines increases in violent crime
during the democratic transition, arguing homicide rates increased among municipalities
with greater electoral competition. The increased violence, Villarreal argues, is due in
part to disruptions within patronage networks.51 This disruption to patronage networks
becomes especially apparent in more rural areas where such hierarchical networks are
more entrenched, leading to a loss of social and political control. In Allende, former
systems of social and political control were replaced by Los Zetas’ unique brand of
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criminality. The group integrated themselves within social structures of order and
cohesion. Los Zetas purchased businesses, married into local families, and coerced the
local labor force to support their operations. Top leaders Miguel Treviño Morales and his
brother Omar even made Allende their home. Ultimately the process of integration by
Los Zetas coupled with DEA operational indiscretion and Mexican security leaks
created an environment where Los Zetas could operate with impunity.
3.3 A Case for Impunity
The fractures within the justice system, lack of a cohesive system of
accountability, and endemic poverty within police forces contributed to increased law
enforcement collaboration with criminal organizations. In Nuevo Laredo alone, it has
been estimated that during the height of Los Zetas’ power approximately “90 percent of
the municipal police were allegedly on Los Zetas’ payroll.” 52 As employees of the
organization, the police were directed to alert Los Zetas when unauthorized groups
were moving commodities through their territory and when rival organizations or the
military were conducting operations in the region. Los Zetas also directed law
enforcement personnel to secure safe houses.53
According to a special report by Michael Evans of the National Security Archive,
the military received multiple reports about the violence in Allende. On March 20, 2011,
the army sent a patrol to the Garza Ranch after a man reported the disappearance of
multiple family members. The soldiers “found doors torn off, the building sacked, spent
shell casings, dead animals, burned buildings, and a pick-up truck riddled with bullets,
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but no people.”54 The reasons the army was reluctant to investigate further is unknown
but illustrates the absence of state order in the region. The military’s reluctance to
investigate not only left evidence unsecured but directly affected people like Elvira
Espinoza who reported three of her grandchildren as disappeared from Allende. She
found two of her grandchildren at an orphanage a week after their disappearance. Later
Espinoza discovered the two young children and their infant brother had been
separated from their parents and held for days. The two older children were then
dropped off at a park. The baby, Mauricio, was too little to be left at the park, Los Zetas
told the older children, he cried too much. Los Zetas then separated baby Mauricio from
the older children. He has not been seen since.55
While there are unanswered questions regarding the reluctance of the military to
investigate further, there is direct testimony connecting the local police to the crimes.
Christian Alejandro Lopez Tamez, the Allende fire chief, identified officials from the
Allende police department who were connected to the massacre during his testimony on
December 17, 2014.56 “When I saw all those police I realized that they were keeping
watch or guarding the place, that is to say the ranch.”57 Lopez adds he spent a lot of
time with police in what was after all a small town, and he can therefore positively
identify its members. Before condemning the police department, it is important to
remember city officials were in an impossible position. If they refused to cooperate with
Los Zetas or refused payments they were given for their cooperation, they put their lives
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and the lives of their family at risk. Similarly, journalists who were paid to kill stories or
not investigate certain crimes did so not necessarily out of adherence to the authority of
Los Zetas but because to do otherwise would immediately endanger lives.
Events such as those in Allende are often viewed as the result of Mexican
corruption and seen as inevitable in the region, but Allende also raises significant issues
relating to the role of U.S. intelligence when interacting with Mexican security forces.
Allende is approximately 40 minutes from the border and remains inextricably connected
to the United States, recalling the fluidity of North America during globalization. U.S.
intelligence, therefore, has a responsibility to the citizens of Mexico to ensure their safety.
The fact that the U.S. frivolously shared information with Mexican security forces when
they had been explicitly warned that sharing information could result in violence is
problematic, but it also speaks to the need for international solutions. Human rights
violations are not Mexico’s “problem” but the problem of everyone concerned with the civil
and political rights of all human beings. Allende illuminates the international responsibility
of all nations to ensure global safety.
Like the police and journalists, mayors and other city officials often had to make
difficult choices when encountering criminal organizations. Mauricio Fernandez, who
served as the mayor of San Pedro Garza, details the infiltration of criminal organizations
into state systems and their use of irregular warfare, claiming “I hear about events
occurring—through mayors, through friends of mine with cattle ranches, through people
who say: ‘Well, they came, and landed in helicopters, and killed everyone.”58 On his
friend’s ranch, he asserts, “helicopters came in and basically massacred everyone.”59
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Much of the violence against public officials did not result in formal investigations, and
the search for truth was often left to journalists and activists. While it’s easy to blame
mayors or police who turned a blind eye to violence, without the support of the military,
and with copious intelligence leaks, ethical governance verges on impossible.
In August of 2010, Edelmiro Cavazos, the mayor of Santiago, Nuevo Leon, was
at his home when he noticed an approaching convoy. Wanting to know the nature of the
visit, Cavazos and his bodyguard approached the group. Both Cavazos and his
bodyguard were then kidnapped “by at least 15 gunman wearing uniforms of a defunct
police agency who arrived in a convoy of sport-utility vehicles, with patrol lights
flashing.”60 While the bodyguard was later released, and still later found to be complicit
in the crime, Cavazos’s “bound, blindfolded body was found dumped alongside a rural
road.”61 It was hypothesized by Nuevo Leon Governor Rodrigo Medina that the
execution was in retaliation for anti-corruption efforts made by the 38-eight-year-old
Cavazos. State Attorney General of Nuevo Leon Alejandro Garza y Garza reported
police officers, who were arrested in connection to the slaying, “admitted they worked
for the Zetas as lookouts.”62 The killing had been ordered by a Zeta leader, reportedly
Angel Virgilio Avila Sanchez, known as El Vampiro,63 after the police officers/zeta
operatives complained the mayor had disciplined them (he apparently initiated pay cuts
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and other disciplinary measures after Cavazos discovered the officers were wrongfully
issuing citations to mountain bikers), leading them to assume Cavazos worked for a
rival criminal organization.
In 2010, approximately fifteen mayors were executed by criminal organizations in
Mexico.64 Often there was collaboration between municipal police forces and criminal
organizations. The executions and the duplicity of police forces illuminates the fluidity
between state and non-state actors during this time as well as the legacy of
militarization and governmental impunity. Los Zetas, considering their military culture,
were well-suited to form an alliance with police forces. Mayor Mauricio Fernandez spoke
with Cavazos before his death. Cavazos reportedly said he “received a “threatening visit
from traffickers shortly after taking office.”65 Fernandez urged Cavazos to call in the
army, remembering “he was frightened and had found a municipal government
enormously in cahoots with organized crime.”66 The surge in mayoral murders can be
viewed as a challenge to the state’s monopoly on violence, but the continuity between
authoritarianism and militarization also becomes apparent, inevitably breeding impunity.
As discussed in Chapter 2, “the police did not merely secure the state in the face of
citizen mobilization and political challenge; they also became part of the problem.” 67 The
fragmentation of police forces bred “conflict and competition,” and issues of
accountability. In the case of municipalities occupied by Los Zetas, the alliance between
the local police and Zetas presented an impossible situation for mayors and other public
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officials as the fluidity between state and non-state actors often made opposition a
choice between life and death.
3.4 Media Resistance
In 2011, Los Zetas became very concerned with social media. Media may have
been disrupting operations due to real-time reporting. Activist bloggers were known to
broadcast interactive maps “which logged where drugs were sold, stash houses were
based and where the halcones” stood watch,68 but more than that, bloggers openly
questioned Zeta authority. This period can be characterized as the height of Zeta
violence, especially in relation to the public, and this escalation correlates to intensified
media opposition. As the state’s failure to ensure public safety became apparent, the
public filled the void of state weakness to uphold order. The fall of 2011 was marked by
the murders of multiple bloggers who publicly denounced the Zeta occupation of Nuevo
Laredo.
First, on September 13, two social media activists “were found hanging from a
bridge.”69 There were signs found with the bodies that read, “this will happen to all
internet snitches,” putting Frontera al Rojo Vivo, Blog del Narco, and Denuncia
Ciudadano on notice.70 Then on September 24, Maria Elizabeth Macias, the editor of
Nuevo Laredo newspaper Primera Hora and a blogger for Nuevo Laredo en Vivo
(NLV),71 was found decapitated in Nuevo Laredo. Known as “La Nena Laredo,” or the
Girl of Laredo, the editor’s head was placed on La Glorieta de Colon, a Christopher
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Columbus monument in Nuevo Laredo, with a message: “’Ok Nuevo Laredo en Vivo
and social media sites. I am Nena de Laredo and I’m here because of my actions, for
trusting the army and the navy…Thank you for your attention,”72 signed ZZZ. A few
months later, A second blogger at NLV, a 35-year-old male known as “El Rascatripas,73
was tortured, decapitated, and dumped, like Macias, near La Glorieta de Colon, with a
sign: “Hi I’m Rascatripas and this happened to me because I didn’t understand I
shouldn’t post things on social networks.”74
The ability of Los Zetas to track media users has been attributed to informants or
possibly cybersecurity experts. Either way, the acts of violence are indicative of Los
Zetas’ technological adeptness and their media savvy. The messaging backfired,
however, unleashing even more national and international outrage. Viewed through the
theoretical framework of Franco, the bodies of Macias, El Rascatripas, and the 2 other
activists, are clearly intended to be expressions of Zeta power, warning opponents
about the consequences of resistance. The question is, who sent the message? Los
Zetas? Macias? There is dual messaging at play, depending on the perspective. The
expression of the body is an interaction between sender and receiver, a negotiation.
While intended to be a form of coercive power, the more dominant message remains
the power of activists to exact change.
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3.5 Tamaulipas
On August 22, 2010, Ecuadoran Luis Fredy Lala Pomavilla, and “approximately
75 migrants from Guatemala, Honduras, Brazil, and Ecuador,”75 were traveling in panel
trucks along the highway between Ciudad Victoria and San Fernando, Tamaulipas, in
an effort to reach the U.S. border. As they neared the U.S. border, approximately ninety
miles from Brownsville, Texas, they were stopped by armed Zetas and transported to a
ranch in San Fernando. Once at the compound, Los Zetas offered the kidnapped
migrants the opportunity to work for the organization. The men were offered work as
sicarios and the women were offered work as cooks. They could earn good money,
more than they could hope to earn through legitimate work, a staggering $500 per
week.76
Lala remembers the refusals uttered that night. All but one of the men and
women who had made the arduous journey from Central America, who were almost
there, almost, refused to work for Los Zetas. Their refusal to work for the organization
was not well-received, and every member of the group who refused, except for one
female and one child who were separated from the rest, was escorted to a nearby
warehouse, bound and blindfolded, and shot in the back of the head. In total, fifty-eight
men and fourteen women were executed that day. Lala passed out after being shot in
the jaw. According to Lala’s testimony, he miraculously awoke hours later and found
everyone dead except for one Salvadoran male. Lala and the unidentified Salvadoran
then fled the ranch in different directions, searching for help. Lala indicated he “heard
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trucks pursuing the other survivor and later heard gun shots, which led him to believe
that the Salvadoran had been caught and executed.”77
When Lala asked people in the area for assistance (in one account Lala asked
the police for help, and during another interview, Lala asked occupants in a house near
the Zeta compound), they refused, and so he continued to walk through the night.
During the “early morning hours of Monday, August 23”78 Lala approached a Mexican
Navy checkpoint near San Fernando, Mexico, where he finally found help. Based on
Lala’s information, the Mexican Navy began searching for the site of the massacre, and
then came into contact with Zetas at a nearby ranch. A gun battle ensued, leaving a
marine and three Zetas dead. On Tuesday, August 24, at around 6 p.m., the military
found the executed migrants. They had been piled up against the wall of a warehouse.
On August 30, Lala returned to Ecuador, refusing to stay in Mexico even after the GOM
offered the eighteen-year-old a humanitarian visa.79
Motivations for this crime have long been under investigation, and the answers
remain unclear. Security analysts find it unconvincing that Los Zetas were motivated by
a need to recruit new members.80 It also seems questionable that Los Zetas mistakenly
identified the migrants as members of another criminal organization. They were travel
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worn and from Central America, and Los Zetas would not have linked them to rivals.
There has been speculation that the profits for smuggling the migrants were to be paid
to the CDG, who were in an ongoing conflict with Los Zetas, but even this explanation is
questionable considering the extreme nature of the crimes. That said, Los Zetas are
known for such extremities and so the explanation cannot be ruled out.
The migrant massacre marked the beginning of a string of violent events that
occurred in Tamaulipas between August 22-27, 2010:81
•

On August 24, two Secretaría de la Defensa (SEDENA) and four members of
Los Zetas were killed during an altercation in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. It was
reported that Los Zetas utilized advanced weaponry including an RPG and the
situation was so volatile that the public was advised to stay indoors for safety.

•

On August 24, two blocks from the U.S. Consulate, a grenade was detonated
near the Matamoros City Water Offices. The attack was near the B&M
International Bridge and resulted in the closure of lanes heading into Mexico.

•

On August 25, Roberto Jaime Suarez Vasquez, who was the San Fernando
State Prosecutor, and Juan Carlos Sanchez Suarez, who was the San Fernando
Municipal Police Director, were reported missing after investigating the
Tamaulipas Massacre on August 24.

•

On August 27, another grenade was thrown at the Department of Public Safety in
the city of Valle Hermoso. The building was damaged during the attack, but no
injuries occurred.
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•

On August 27, a car bomb was detonated in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas,
outside of the Mexican Televisa station. The station’s towers were damaged,
causing the station to discontinue broadcasting.

•

On August 27, another car bomb was detonated in Ciudad Victoria near the
transit police.82

While Zeta operations in 2010 and 2011 are a clear challenge to state authority, the
period is also marked by popular opposition that correlates to the overall decline of the
organization. As discussed in Chapter 2, indiscriminate violence was a crucial component
to Zeta branding, but the events of Allende and Tamaulipas solidified a foundation of
opposition that Los Zetas could not effectively combat. After the well-publicized human
rights violations, law enforcement intensified efforts to capture Zeta leaders and on the
morning of July 13, 2013, Miguel Treviño, or Z-40, was captured by Mexican Marines in
Anahuac, near Nuevo Laredo.83 Activism and the sacrifice of mayors, journalists,
migrants, and many others can be viewed as integral to the decline of Los Zetas. As Lucio
Cabañas became an inspiration for leftist revolutionaries, the people impacted by Los
Zetas’ violence became an inspiration for activists. By examining resistance to Los Zetas,
we find the opposition was deeply rooted in not only a culture of impunity but a confluence
of historical contexts, including the process of democratization and the Mexican Dirty War.
The intensity of violence during this period can be linked to the Calderon presidency, of
course, but historical connections go still deeper, and the fight for transparency and
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justice assumes an equal role in the conflict. The deaths of journalists in Nuevo Laredo,
the executions of the 72 migrants in San Fernando, and countless others, should
therefore be viewed as expressions of power beyond that of Los Zetas and a mechanism
for change.
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Chapter 4
Neoliberalism and Criminality
During the 1990s, economists and policymakers proselytized the benefits of a
less regulated market economy, viewing the formula known as the Washington
Consensus as an elixir guaranteed to facilitate unlimited growth.1 Many leading
advocates of the Consensus thought there was a role for government in creating
frameworks to facilitate globalization, but there was nevertheless a marked shift to
deregulation and privatization.2 In short, advocates of neoliberalism thought the
government should “simply get out of the way and let the markets do their work.”3
While many now vilify globalization as a harbinger of poverty and death in the
developing world, the costs and benefits of triumphalist capitalism transcend such
narratives. Economist Joseph Stiglitz, while a critic of globalization, argues reduced
barriers for international trade allowed many countries a faster path to development,
including Asia where millions were better off with export-led growth policies.4
Additionally, globalization brought a sense of connectivity, combatting the economic and
social alienation many people felt throughout the developing world.
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The interconnectedness simultaneously facilitated an increased access to knowledge
and resources that were not previously within reach.
While globalization brought increased connectivity throughout the world, it has
also been a hegemonic force of the elite,5 creating a space for a select few, including
educational institutions, the media, and private capital to curate world discourse and
accumulate wealth. Neoliberalism did create an aspirational zone within developing
countries, in which barriers for growth were seemingly demolished, yet questions linger
as to the long-term effects of such economic policies. Critics of liberalization claim the
promised growth was a façade, masking the true purpose of globalization, that of
subjugation and exploitation. This chapter will look at neoliberalism in relation to Los
Zetas to examine how reforms have infiltrated the public and private sphere,
comprehensively dividing and reorienting values and social systems.
Los Zetas have benefitted from globalization and from the restructuring of
national frameworks and hierarchies, but how has the organization become an object of
a neoliberal agenda? While this thesis does not claim that there is collusion between
TCOs and transnational corporations, it does examine the paradoxical alignment
between the two zones of operation. Los Zetas have clearly contributed to the
destabilization of Mexico, facilitating socioeconomic schisms throughout their regions of
operation. Their zones of interference have not been arbitrary, however, and have
occurred in areas that are extremely rich in undeveloped natural resources. While Los
Zetas did not consciously collaborate with the state and corporations to destabilize the

5

David Harvey, "Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction," The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 610 (2007): 23.
67

region, the instability they wrought did make space for private investment. Los Zetas
can therefore be viewed as agents of neoliberalism and a force of social change.
4.1 Economic Transition
Prior to the 1980s, Latin American economic policy was dominated by import
substitution industrialization (ISI), in which the state facilitated economic development
and growth, investing in projects such as railways, seaports, and refineries, to promote
capital accumulation.6 Under this system, the state is the agent of change and the
markets support the mandates of the state through their development. Political scientist
Wendy Brown describes the process of neoliberal reform as transmogrifying “every
human domain and endeavor, along with humans themselves, according to a specific
image of the economic.”7 If modernity can be understood in part as a process of
substitution whereby science, reason, and centrally organized governments replace
monarchical allegiance and religious morality, neoliberalism can similarly be viewed as
a framework that elevates the market economy to the new primary point of allegiance.
The neoliberal transition is a significant factor in the evolution of Los Zetas in that
the restructuring of economic policy and state apparatus not only created economic
insecurity for large portions of the population but fractured social groups and traditions.
In his wildly successful 1999 monograph The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Pulitzer Prize
winning author Thomas Friedman argued globalization, “a new, very greased,
interconnected system,”8 would not fracture systems but would allow us to connect the
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dots and vanquish chaos. This new system would demolish the walls between
“countries, markets and disciplines”9 and increase efficiency. In short, globalization had
more benefits than drawbacks. Like Modernization Theory, in which there is a single
path to progress, globalization would homogenize the international systems to propel us
to a universal order. For Latin America, this order is inherently undemocratic not only
because it has been mandated by the U.S., but also because its structural design
creates an uneven landscape for growth. Thus, globalization became a structural force
of violence.
ISI helped facilitate growth following WWII, and from 1945-1975 the Mexican
Miracle was largely viewed as a success story. The downside to ISI, as discussed in
Chapter 3, was the growing economic marginalization in states such as Guerrero. After
increasing economic stagnation during the 1970s and the immense growth of social
movements throughout Latin America, the U.S. treasury and lending institutions
“persuaded” Mexico to deconstruct more centralized state systems that were developed
under ISI and implement reforms that fell within the framework of the Washington
Consensus. The restructuring included the dismantlement of bureaucracies and the
deregulation and privatization of industries. Neoliberal policies, and the shift toward a
market driven state, both facilitated increased rates of socioeconomic inequality and an
unequal access to resources, including clean water, healthy foods, and quality
education, thereby creating barriers to upward mobility.
By 2003, income inequality was high, with the poorest one-tenth of Latin
American families earning 1.6 percent of the total income. The wealthiest families in
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Latin America, on the other hand, earned 48 percent of total income.10 With dramatically
reduced opportunities and the inability to compete with transnational corporations in the
formal economic sector, workers fled to the informal sector, and by the end of the
1990s, 40 percent of workers in Mexico earned a living through informal means.11 Data
from the United Nations indicates that 70 percent of jobs created in Latin America
between 1990 and 1997 were in the informal sector, and by 2000, 59 percent of urban
work was also informal, a 19 percent jump from 1980.12 The structural links between
formal and informal sectors under liberalization created more opportunities for criminal
organizations to expand, forcing informal sectors to continually interact with criminal
actors for basic needs.
Under neoliberalism, the concept of an informal economic sector became an
opaque reality, with formal organizations exploiting the informal sectors to increase
profits. With reduced rates of pay and long hours, the sector was extraordinarily
valuable to private industry as well as private citizens of higher socioeconomic classes.
During the 1990s, for instance, informal sectors often supplied formal organizations with
products and services at a discounted rate. In short, the increasing poverty and
exclusion became a method to increase surplus value without fairly compensating the
source. Additionally, the fluidity between the formal and informal spheres made it
challenging to determine the origins of products and services and whether goods were
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produced ethically. Put within the context of the economic stagnation of the 1970s, and
liberalization becomes a path for transferring wealth back to the ruling class.
4.2 Structural Exclusion and Violence
In 2001, the media reported on the severe mistreatment of a 12-year-maid who
was held in abhorrent conditions by Sandra Beardon, of Laredo, Texas.13 When the
police found the girl, she was covered in cuts and bruises and sent to the intensive care
unit, where she received treatment for dehydration as well as skin and eye infections.
When she was not fulfilling her duties as a maid, the girl was chained to a pole in the
Beardons’ backyard, and had police not discovered her, doctors insist she would not
have survived another week.14 During the trial, it was reported that Mrs. Beardon had
forced the girl to eat dog feces, sleep outside, and had sexually assaulted her by
inserting a tool into her private parts.15 Mrs. Beardon’s sadistic tendencies also included
breaking a broom over the girl’s back, hitting her over the head with a glass bottle, and
spraying her in the face with red pepper if she didn’t think the child was performing her
chores to standard.16 It was later discovered that seven months previously Mrs.
Beardon had traveled to an impoverished village in Veracruz where she had persuaded
the child’s parents to allow the girl to migrate to the United States where she would
have more opportunities. Beardon then smuggled the girl across the McAllen, Texas
border, finally taking the child back to her home in Laredo.
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The Beardon case exemplifies the experiences of one family that arose within the
confines of socioeconomic marginalization, but the communal experience of alienation
and subjugation, over time, can translate to a culture of violence. Children, for instance,
are often born without birth certificates and exist without access to state services.
Persons within these spheres move outside the order of state structures but are
nevertheless expected to adhere to its mandates. It is thus, as Magaly Sanchez has
explained, that “under conditions of prolonged informality and illegality, and without
official documentation, the structural violence of neoliberalism produced new
expressions of violence.”17 There is a sphere of invisibility that surrounds concentrated
areas of poverty, and without official status or the means to gain status or visibility,
autonomy can be affected for life.
Los Zetas are a magnification of this structural effect, manifesting in unique
forms. Despite their uniqueness, they are nevertheless connected to the structural
violence of liberalization, both in terms of their organizational capabilities, including their
migrant trafficking monopolization, and in terms of their evolution. As discussed in
Chapter 2, Guzmán and Lazcano, Z-1 and Z-3 respectively, both came from military
backgrounds while Miguel Treviño Morales, Z-40, considered by many to be the most
violent Zeta, did not have any military training. Instead, Z-40 was the product of border
culture. It is in Texas, not Mexico, United States investigators claim, that Treviño
Morales, the teenager, was transformed into Z-40, the violent criminal.
According to detective Roberto García, Treviño Morales preyed upon teenagers
in Texas, recruiting young people who came from socioeconomic backgrounds similar
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to his own. Police reports indicate a new generation of Zetas were operating in the
Dallas area, and unlike their predecessors, the new generation was better assimilated
within the region and therefore more difficult for law enforcement to identify. As products
of both American culture and bias, and motivated by the desire for class mobility, their
appearance solidifies the connection between the United States and Los Zetas
throughout the group’s evolution.
The undercover detective who raised the alarm about Los Zetas operational
capacity in Texas, claims, “I wasn’t trying to make anybody panic,” but the fact was Los
Zetas were expanding and recruiting in Texas. The city, afraid the report would scare
away investors, dismissed the findings and refused to take action. The detective admits
the police were not proactive in stopping Zeta recruitment and operations in Texas and
questions whether more robust interventions could have prevented violence in Mexico,
musing, “maybe had we been more engaged, things could have turned out differently.”18
While it is problematic to engage in counterfactual history, there remains a clear
connection between Los Zetas and the United States, both in terms of militarization and
socioeconomic alienation within border zones. Minimally, the connection challenges the
idea that TCO violence, including the massacres in Tamaulipas and Allende, are
exclusive products of Mexican society. Beyond this, it illustrates the effects of intimate
border relations as well as the relegation of Brown bodies to zones of informality,
illegality, and servitude.
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4.3 Oil in Tamaulipas
The state of Tamaulipas has been central to Zeta operations, resulting in
escalating violence and instability throughout the region. It is also, coincidentally or not,
a strategic geographic location for the energy sector, with significant oil and gas
deposits located in or near the state, particularly in the Burgos Basin, Tampico-Misantla,
and in the Gulf of Mexico.19 Furthermore, the energy resources identified have been
largely undeveloped and therefore are potentially lucrative for investors. For instance, in
2010, while there were 11,000 explored deposits in Tamaulipas, there were only 1,900
that were operational,20 and in 2014, the government of Tamaulipas estimated that
approximately 65 percent of the 52.6 thousand million barrels of crude oil that had been
identified by Pemex as a prospective resource was in Tamaulipas.21
After NAFTA was enacted in 1994, transnational corporations were allowed more
operational capacity in the region. As a result, private companies such as Halliburton,
Delta, and Schlumberger were able to work as contractors for Petróleos Mexicanos
(PEMEX). The transition to private investment in the region intensified during the
succeeding years, and in 2017, a few years after the peak in violence, most notably in
2011, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) disclosed Mexico’s Secretariat
of Energy, or SENER, would begin allowing private companies to explore and develop
the Burgos Basin for natural gas.22 Since the creation of PEMEX, energy exploration
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has been limited to state agents and the reform marks a notable policy shift with
significant consequences for the region.
Even though shale deposits in the basin are the most undeveloped in the
country, recent years have seen a decrease in PEMEX production.23 In 2012, for
instance, PEMEX invested $657 million on exploration and production in the region. By
2017, PEMEX had reduced its investment in the Burgos Basin to $51 million, down
92%.24 While there are challenges to production in the basin, including low permeability,
in which the oil or gas cannot move quickly through the rock, requiring additional
pressure for efficient resource extraction, the increased investment by private
companies indicates there is substantial value in the region.
Considering many of the most violent zones in Mexico, including Tamaulipas,
Coahuila, the Juárez Valley, and Michoacán, are also extremely rich in energy
resources, questions of correlation and motivation naturally arise. Motivations for Los
Zetas occur on multiple levels and are consistently connected to neoliberal reforms and
ethos. Specifically, and most glaringly, increased exclusion from upward social mobility
sparked desire among expanding portions of the population, including those living along
border zones, to expand wealth through criminal means. This is especially apparent
when examining the youth recruitment by Z-40 in Dallas, Texas. While the desire for
wealth is not a new phenomenon, the expanding interaction between criminal groups
and populations living within informal zones has significantly increased the opportunity
for TCOs to diversify operations.
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Beyond the desire for mobility, the reconfiguration of state and social structures
under the neoliberal transition can be viewed as a significant factor in Los Zetas’
development, especially their expansion into migrant trafficking. According to David
Harvey, dispossession is crucial to the expansion of capital,25 and acts as a key method
for the redistribution of wealth. In Mexico, there is a marked pattern whereby surges in
violence consistently occur in energy-rich regions. While it is not the intention of Los
Zetas to create instability and dispossess people of land so private investors can
develop Tamaulipas, they nevertheless serve the interests of such investors, who
opportunistically seek out societal fractures in the name of progress. In 2017,
BNamericas, an investment tool that focuses on Latin America, declared the state of
Tamaulipas was poised to become a “major energy hub” in the coming years.26 With
Tamaulipas expected to receive more than $32 billion in exploration and development
contracts, and with the state governor, Francisco García Cabeza de Vaca meeting with
Texas officials to shore up energy and infrastructure ties, the state that was home to
some of the worst massacres in Mexico’s history is well-positioned to be a windfall for
energy investors.
4.4 Instability in Tamaulipas
Between 2006 and 2015, Tamaulipas was marked by instability, and reported a
total of 5,720 disappeared, the highest in the nation. The region was also the location of
a large number of mass grave sites, for which Los Zetas were responsible. On April 6,
2011, the U.S. Consulate in Matamoros reported SEDENA had discovered two mass
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graves containing 48 bodies near San Fernando in Tamaulipas.27 Many of the bodies,
two of which were wearing police uniforms, were in advanced stages of decomposition
while others appeared to have died within the last seven to ten days.28 The varying
degrees of decomposition indicates Los Zetas had been disposing of bodies in these
mass graves for a considerable period of time, and that it was standard operating
procedure rather than a unique event.
Then on April 8, 2011, the U.S. Consulate in Matamoros reported the discovery
of additional mass graves near San Fernando. Mexican federal officials said they had
discovered a total of 81 bodies in 17 burial sites and believed that the majority of the
bodies belonged to people that were kidnapped from public buses that had run through
San Fernando.29 The investigation came as a result of information that was obtained
from kidnapping victims and arrested members of Los Zetas, and resulted in the arrest
of seventeen Zetas and sixteen members of the San Fernando Police Department.30
At the conclusion of the SEDENA investigation, which took place between April 1-14,
2011, Mexican officials reported they had discovered a total of 145 bodies spread out
over 36 gravesites.31 Off the record, Mexican officials indicated the bodies were spread
amongst different gravesites to make the massacres appear less alarming to the public.
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The consulate report also indicates the Tamaulipas bus companies did not
officially report the attacks on the line or any subsequent kidnappings. Certain bus lines
did modify their routes through San Fernando and avoided nighttime travel, but other
companies made no modifications. For instance, of the five bus lines that ran through
the area, two, Omnibus and ETN, discontinued their Matamoros-Ciudad Victoria routes,
Senda only offered the route during the day, and Transpais and Grupo Estrella Blanca
continued to run their normal schedules, including trips that were scheduled at night.
State officials were apparently concerned reports about the region’s security issues
would have a negative impact on tourism, specifically tourism during the holy week
vacation period.32
According to the testimony of Alvaro Alba Terrazaz, a police officer detained in
connection with the kidnappings, both police and transit officials assisted Los Zetas,
turning persons of interest over to the TCO. In effect, there was a sophisticated network
of informants and active criminal participants embedded within both the transit system
and the municipal police to uphold the authority of Los Zetas in Tamaulipas.
The negligence and collusion of transit companies illustrates the widespread infiltration
of Los Zetas within transit infrastructure, but it also reflects the overall prioritization of
profit over human life. This is not a new phenomenon, yet the prioritization of capital
coupled with the indiscriminate violence of TCOs in Tamaulipas does elevate the
intensity of such prioritizations. While cancelling routes altogether may have further
decreased the mobility of the residents in Tamaulipas, the complete lack of official
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reporting, and the non-modification of bus routes, elevates the ethical negligence of the
companies, reflecting the internalization of broader neoliberal constructs.
Motivation for the bus attacks was revealed through the testimony of Zeta Edgar
Huerta Montiel, who told authorities members were ordered by Heriberto Lazcano
Lazcano, Z-3, to screen incoming buses, especially those coming from Michoacán, for
reinforcements for the CDG, whom Los Zetas were actively engaged in a conflict.
According to Montiel, Los Zetas would intercept buses and scan passengers’ cell
phones for evidence that connected them to the CDG. Montiel recounted the process
for screening, saying, “Every day a bus would come, and every day we would pull the
people off and investigate them.”33 Once the passengers were adequately vetted, “those
that had nothing to do with it were freed, and those that did were killed.” 34 While at first
the kidnappings appeared to be the direct result of the conflict between Los Zetas and
the CDG, which remains questionable considering Los Zetas have a history of killing
indiscriminately, closer examination reveal additional factors at work.
The crimes and rapidly declining security can be viewed as an integral catalyst
for land dispossession. By initiating terror, division, and spaces of silence, whereby the
media, state officials, and the public are fearful of reporting criminal acts, Los Zetas
were able to destroy state infrastructure and social systems in their areas of operation.
Instead of disavowing such acts of violence, media and officials that do report on
crimes, often attempt to divert attention away from violent acts by framing the victims as
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partially responsible, either by indicating they were involved in criminal activities or by
implying they were engaged in dangerous activities such as migration. It is thus through
destruction that private investment is able to expand its development of regions rich in
resources, such as Tamaulipas.
In Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein names “orchestrated raids on the public sphere
in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting
market opportunities, ‘disaster capitalism,’”35 arguing the free market is dependent on
shock to transfer immense amounts of wealth to the elite. Klein uses Hurricane Katrina
to illustrate the methods used by elites to exploit tragedy for the expansion of wealth.
After the hurricane, Klein recalls how a Republican congressman from New Orleans,
Richard Baker, touted the benefits of the natural disaster, telling lobbyists, “We finally
cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but God did it.” 36 He
wasn’t alone. Joseph Canizaro, a wealthy developer in the region, expressed similar
elation about the displacement of residents, saying, “I think we have a clean sheet to
start again. And with that clean sheet we have some very big opportunities.”37 One of
the “opportunities” that arose from the disaster came from the rapid privatization of the
school system, in which the vast majority of the public schools were converted into
privately run charter schools, all while the city’s marginalized communities were exiled
from their homes.
New Orleans is not Tamaulipas, yet they, and other shocks to the system, share
striking similarities. Harvey argues that accumulation by dispossession can be achieved
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through the forceful expulsion of peasants, the conversion of property rights, from
communal to private, for instance, and through the appropriation of natural resources.38
In Tamaulipas, these forms of neoliberal resource appropriation have clearly been
facilitated by Los Zetas’ unique use of violence. Katrina was a “natural” disaster, viewed
by capitalists as a cleansing, forcing deregulation and enabling opportunists to flourish.
Similarly, Los Zetas can be viewed as a natural occurrence whose evolution is the
logical conclusion to militarization, democratization, and liberalization. Under
neoliberalism, they are akin to soldiers, clearing the space that was previously held by
the communities of Tamaulipas, and indirectly filling the emptiness with transnational
capital.
4.5 Migration and Predation
Exclusion from formal economic sectors has had a tremendous impact on
patterns of migration. Groups such as Los Zetas have targeted vulnerable populations,
perpetrating violence and exploiting migrants through extortion and forced labor.
Violence against migrants was not limited to Mexican citizens, however, and many of
those who were targeted by Los Zetas came from Central America, where Cold War
conflicts and liberalization left the scars of instability. In 2009, there were over 540,000
undocumented immigrants apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol. While 90 percent of
those apprehended were from Mexico, a significant percentage of those migrating North
came from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
During a press conference in 2011, National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)
President Raul Plascencia surprised the public after estimating that over 20,000
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migrants had been kidnapped in Mexico in 2010.39 Considering undocumented peoples
exist within exclusion zones of society, it is extremely difficult to substantiate such
estimates. Regardless of the exact number, there was a consensus amongst
government officials and non-governmental organizations that the potential danger to
migrants was worsening. On January 13, 2011, the presidents of both Mexico and
Guatemala declared TCOs presented the largest threat to migrant security. Additionally,
the UN International Narcotics Control Board (JIFE) found that the consolidation of
power by TCOs like Los Zetas had contributed to a new era of migration for Central
Americans, and that TCOs were now the controlling force in migration. While migrants
have long been vulnerable to exploitation by criminal groups, the period marked an
intensification of predatory behaviors, such as kidnapping and sexual violence.
Previously, there were more independent actors participating in the movement of
migrants, but the highly organized structure, propensity for diversification, and extreme
forms of coercion forced out independent actors, allowing the group to monopolize the
industry.
A January 2011 U.S. Embassy cable details the intensifying dangers facing
migrants on their journey north, arguing the massacres of migrants highlights the
extensive TCO control over migration routes. Migrants often follow the routes of freight
trains north, either by riding the train or by walking along the tracks, creating a focused
space for TCOs to target those seeking safety and opportunity in the United States.
Testimonies indicate TCO members often approach migrants to offer assistance
reaching the border or appear to offer humanitarian aid, such as food, water, and
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shelter. Once under the control of TCO agents, migrants are transported to safe houses
where they are “frequently beaten, poorly fed, and suffer numerous abuses.”40 After
coercing migrants to provide phone numbers of relatives, they are forcibly held until
family members pay for their release (if they are able). CNDH estimates that, on
average, migrants were charged a $2,500 ransom. Considering the CNDH report covers
a period of six months, this translates to $25 million dollars within a short timeframe.
Once held in a safe house, it was difficult to leave without paying the TCO.
Migrants were often tortured and sometimes killed, as was the case in Tamaulipas.
Still others were used as coerced labor to pay their “debt.” The fate of women who fell
under the control of Los Zetas was different and often resulted in rape and sexual
exploitation. A 2010 Amnesty International report indicated that 6 out of 10 migrant
women experienced sexual violence during their journey.41 According to the same
report, smugglers sometimes required women to get contraceptive injections so they did
not become pregnant from rape during the journey. Violence is not necessarily the
direct result of poverty but the result of sustained segregation in concentrated spaces.42
It is through these exclusionary spaces that social fractures naturally occur. If under the
neoliberal system, markets and the aspiration for upward mobility replaces both the
state and community as the framework through which society is viewed, a process of
neoliberal internalization occurs. Traditional familial and social connections become
unmoored from their foundations and disconnected from their meaning. There is thus a
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disintegration of previously held standards and the process of capital accumulation
assumes control of all systems.
In the case of Los Zetas, who are unmoored from traditional patterns of behavior,
the focus should in part center on their role in global patterns of division and
accumulation. Journalist and sociologist Dawn Paley argues we should think beyond
neoliberalism in strictly economic terms and think of post-Cold War conflicts in Latin
America, what she terms drug war capitalism, as a crucial part of the neoliberal war.
Similar to Wendy Brown’s contention that neoliberalism infiltrates all societal systems,
Paley argues the division and terror wrought through neoliberalism is dispersed
throughout the population. The disappearances are crucial to neoliberalism and
therefore to the expansion of capitalism.43
During the Cold War in Latin America, militants and activists who sought societal
change were disappeared. Post-Cold War conflicts, Paley argues, move beyond the
sphere of activism and societal change, targeting the population more broadly.
Specifically, young men regardless of political affiliation now account for most
disappearances and are targeted because of their physical geography.44 According to
the Registro Nacional de Datos de Personas Extraviados o Desaparecidos (RNPED), a
registry for the disappeared, 50 percent of reported disappearances occurred in only 28
municipalities (there a total of 2,547 municipalities in Mexico) and 30 percent of those
reported occurred in either Guerrero or Tamaulipas. Additionally, the locations of the
targets are inextricably connected to racial and socioeconomic demarcations and
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globalization, as many of the disappearances take place along the U.S. border and
along state-run highways, for which there is no toll. With each of these contexts in mind,
the violence can therefore be viewed as directed at specific populations.
The rhetoric in state documentation and within the media often frames the
violence as related to the actions of the victims. A communication from the American
Embassy in El Salvador in 2010, after the death of the 72 migrants in Tamaulipas,
frames the violence as a natural result of “illegal” migration, implicitly assigning blame to
the migrant community. The communication also highlights a cultural propensity in El
Salvador, arguing the population doesn’t view themselves as engaged in illegality.
“Migration to the United States is a unifying factor in Salvadoran society, and is not
regarded by most as illegal, even when it is illegal.”45 The document implies it is the
dangers of illegal migration that should be the focus of popular discourse, not the failure
of the state to protect migrants.
El Salvadorans had an alternate viewpoint and put the massacre on the front
page of every major newspaper. As the number of Salvadoran victims rose, papers
significantly increased their coverage, with certain papers publishing ten articles in one
day.46 The focus of editorials was on criminality and the “GOM’s inability to provide
security and justice,”47 as opposed to misguided victim-blaming. One leftist newspaper
in El Salvador even had the audacity to blame U.S. immigration policy for the tragic
events. Both the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Alianza
Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) were united in their horror of Tamaulipas, focusing
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on the migrants’ hope for a better life as the primary motivation for migration. The U.S.
Embassy, on the other hand, decried the failure of Salvadoran officials and
policymakers to “underscore the dangers of illegal immigration,”48 considering they had
an opportunity to do so in multiple interviews. This failure was, in the words of the U.S.
Embassy, “ironic given the state of security in El Salvador.”49 The outrage against the
GOM’s failure to protect migrants, as well as popular sentiments that thought U.S. policy
contributed to insecurity in the region, challenged U.S. discourse that sought to shift the
focus toward migrant negligence rather than regional insecurity.
4.6 Social Division
Los Zetas’ violent campaign in Tamaulipas was an efficient method for
comprehensively infiltrating social space, sowing division and terror near San Fernando
and beyond. In 2011, after the string of kidnappings in San Fernando, an anonymously
written and unconfirmed article50 was posted in the blog Borderland Beat. Written in
narrative form, the piece recounts a bus hijacking in Tamaulipas, detailing how Los
Zetas forced kidnapped men to fight to the death. According to the story, they were
paired up, given sledgehammers, and told if they survived the fight they would be
allowed to live and join the organization. The complete veracity of the dramatized story
remains questionable; however an anonymous witness did speak with the Houston
Chronicle, substantiating claims that Los Zetas forced kidnapped victims to fight in
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gladiatorial style combat.51 Regardless of whether the witness was truthful, the
gruesome accounting highlights the impact the violence in San Fernando had on
popular consciousness, resulting in altered states of community.52
The impact is not necessarily found in the article itself but is revealed in the
public comment section, where people freely voice anger, repulsion, and opposition to
the kidnappings. Most users are anonymous, and while members of TCOs likely post to
blogs to spread disinformation and propaganda, a pattern nevertheless emerges that
highlights the social fragmentation that occurs throughout Latin America as a result of
escalating violence. While many users openly question whether the story is “true,”
others don’t care if every detail is accurate, declaring the story itself is rooted in truth,
and reflects deeper trends throughout the region. One user recounts their experience,
writing, “i wish all you people behind this key boards would stop trying to figure out if it’s
fake or real and come live a bit of what we live here in mexico…people it’s real i see it
everyday ther’s so much we can’t tell because of fear over here but it’s happening.”53 In
another comment, a user discloses their experience in Tamaulipas: “i used to visit my
family in tamaulipas not anymore is so sad what is happening down there no one dares
to come at night after 6 or 7 pm only them run the streets.”54 These silent zones are a
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potent form of social division, in which people no longer gather in bars, have festivals, or
indeed interact as they did previously.
While the public does find a way to break through enforced silences, they are
nevertheless relegated to more informal formats, such as blogs. In another post, a user
from Brazil reflects upon 4 Brazilian victims who died at the “hands of these
monsters.”55 The commenter does not seem to be directly affected by Los Zetas, but
they are nevertheless psychologically affected by the acts, calling for the extermination
of the group. It is in this way that the blog reflects both the connectivity of the format, in
which the global public can interact in real-time, and the ways in which such connectivity
can facilitate dramatic changes in the mindset of community members. The assaults on
the mind can therefore reach spaces, in effect altering communities, that would
otherwise be out of reach.
Blogs such as Borderland Beat offer a unique opportunity to view the mindset of
those affected by Los Zetas. It also illustrates the extent to which TCOs offer the
“maintenance of extreme inequality,”56 relegating marginalized communities to atomized
zones. The increasing socioeconomic exclusion coupled with social division provides an
effective means to prevent forms of solidarity. There is no direct evidence of collusion
between TCOs and private industry, but there is a consistent alignment of interests
between the two groups, with transnational corporations emerging as the main
benefactors of violence.57 The fear and instability in Tamaulipas caused the
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displacement of residents, creating ghost towns,58 empty space devoid of populations
who had previously called the region home. In effect, the displacement erased the
social structures and community that had been in place prior to the occupation of Los
Zetas. The emptiness in Tamaulipas, which resulted in diminishing land values, then
provided an opportunity for private investors to develop the region so rich in resources.
It is in this way that violence in the region extends to multiple domains within society,
changing the movement through which the public interacted.
Stiglitz argues globalization provided increased connectivity that reduced
alienation and allowed people from varying backgrounds to have access to information
and resources, but that developing countries were largely excluded from the economic
benefits of globalization. While connectivity could be a positive force of change, it
simultaneously provided an opportunity for elites to transform social meanings within all
aspects of life. After neoliberalism was internalized and had replaced socioeconomic
systems, those living outside the formal zone of society were forced to access the
liberal zone by interacting with criminal groups or by existing within the nether regions of
society. It therefore becomes more and more difficult to create private spaces of
meaning according to individual and community needs and values. The alignment
between TCOs and transnational corporations can therefore be viewed as rooted in the
agency of the neoliberal frameworks themselves. In short, globalization has made Los
Zetas, transnational corporations, and government systems agents of the neoliberal
mandate. This is not to argue that private capital does not view instability as an
opportunity or that corporations do not benefit from the violence but that the systems
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themselves transcend individual actors and become a social force through which to
affect change.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Los Zetas transformed the landscape of criminality in Mexico, but the
group is far from an anomaly. By moving past Los Zetas’ sadism and spectacular
use of violence, it is possible to view how the organization is rooted within
historical patterns in not only Mexico but the U.S. as well, existing in a space of
transnational fluidity. Los Zetas, whose original members were trained at Fort
Benning, GA, are an American invention as well as a Mexican one. The evolution
of Z-40 is as much the product of Dallas, Texas, as Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas.
This project builds upon the work of Professor Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera who
argues Los Zetas radically transformed criminal organizations throughout
Mexico, and scholar Dawn Paley who views TCO conflicts in connection to a
neoliberal war, by reframing Los Zetas’ evolution within historical processes like
militarization, democratization, and neoliberalism. Such processes are not static
and monolithic but are reliant on each other to develop and progress. This
reorientation creates a more holistic perspective that recalls the historical
continuity through which the Los Zetas emerged and importantly rejects
essentialist rhetoric.
The study of Los Zetas transcends their unique use of radio technology or
their diversification of operations. It moves beyond their professionalization of
violence that spread throughout Mexico. It even transcends their place within the
post-Cold War paradigm. To study Los Zetas, is also to study the migrants,
journalists, mayors, and townspeople who played an instrumental role in the
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organization’s demise. It is through their perspectives that the power of activism
and sacrifice becomes apparent. While the victims of Los Zetas are often viewed
within a framework of powerlessness, this work reorients such unidirectional
narratives. By examining a robust culture of opposition, rooted in the evolution of
the criminal justice system, resistance in Guerrero, and the process of
democratization, it becomes possible to understand how “victims” are not simply
the objects of Los Zetas’ indiscriminate violence but a force of change.
This study moves beyond even Los Zetas and their opposition, however,
by looking at the post-Cold War infrastructure of power—that of neoliberalism. It
is through this lens that Los Zetas can be viewed as a force of instability, creating
a space through which elite hegemony could thrive. Soldiers of the neoliberal
project, Los Zetas created ghost towns where communities once thrived. They
infiltrated and challenged state spaces, compromising police forces, and
murdering agents of the state. They instilled terror in their zones of operation,
dispossessing people not only of their lands but of the moments that forge
solidarity—dances, weddings, funerals.
The model of Los Zetas, therefore, while different from the Cold-War
model of violence, is unquestionably connected to the political. In 2020, by the
November count, 32,759 people had been murdered in Mexico.1 On January 22,
2021, nineteen migrants, three Mexican and sixteen Guatemalan, were executed
by police forces in Tamaulipas, their burned bodies left in a pickup truck
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approximately forty miles from the U.S. border.2 There is an alternate vision of
Tamaulipas, however, one that includes the March 2021 Inter-American
Petroleum Technology Exhibition. Jalil Alva Monterrubio, director of the
exhibition, stated the objective of the event was to develop projects such as
deep-sea explorations: “We are inviting foreign investors to come and see what
we are doing in Tamaulipas; to be able to generate investment from the oil sector
within the state.”3 While globalization has increased growth and connectivity for
certain sectors, its legacy of division, forming spaces of informality, illegality, and
structural violence, cannot be denied. For those looking to better understand the
violence in Mexico today, historicizing groups such as Los Zetas remains of vital
importance.
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